DISINFO RADAR: Watch and Warn, October 2026 edition
Anticipated flashpoint events likely to fuel disinformation narratives in the Western Balkans during October 2025.
Western Balkans Watch and Warn: EU enlargement agenda may fuel narratives of double standards and external pressure
The European Council meeting on 15–16 October and the forthcoming Enlargement Package are likely to renew debate over Western Balkan accession, while discussions of support for Ukraine provide a further trigger for anti-EU and anti-NATO messaging. Disinformation could connect frustration over membership delays and bilateral disputes with claims that Western institutions are hostile to the region’s interests or responsible for war. North Macedonia’s dispute with Bulgaria provides a particularly salient route for turning identity-related grievances into anti-EU sentiment, which could be reinforced by recurring pro-Kremlin narratives.
On 6 October, the European Commission presented its pre-enlargement policy reviews, outlining possible changes to the EU’s institutions, policies and budget, and proposing safeguards for future accession treaties. The October European Council agenda includes enlargement and reforms, continued support for Ukraine and Russia-related hybrid threats. Together with the forthcoming annual country assessments, these discussions provide several opportunities for official proposals, reform requirements and geopolitical decisions to be selectively quoted or misrepresented.
Disinformation may portray the accession process as deliberate exclusion or political coercion, using differences between countries’ progress to claim that Brussels rewards compliant governments while disregarding others’ identities and interests. These include ongoing propagation of “fascist EU” narrative and possible distortion of proposed safeguards into claims that all future members would automatically lose voting rights, while conditional roadmaps could be presented as either guaranteed membership dates or evidence of permanent second-class status.
In North Macedonia, issues from the dispute with Bulgaria could be used to present Sofia as a proxy for an EU that does not want the Western Balkan countries as members. Speculation about new Bulgarian demands from bilateral protocols being added to the negotiating framework could strengthen that message. The enlargement debate may also intersect with persistent anti-Ukraine messaging, including repetitive debunked claims blaming Zelenskyy, the EU and NATO for the war in Ukraine, portraying Western assistance as aggression or suggesting that European integration entails unwanted participation in war. In this way, local grievances and geopolitical disinformation could reinforce portrayal of Western institutions as coercive, unjust and dangerous.
Particular attention should be paid to fabricated summit conclusions, misleading translations of accession documents, false quotations and claims of new obligations that are not supported by the published decisions. These are concrete indicators of manipulation; criticism of enlargement policy, bilateral conditionality or support for Ukraine should be assessed on its factual content.
Albania: EU enlargement report may fuel narratives of foreign interference and political bias
The European Commission’s annual enlargement package is an important moment in Albania’s EU accession process, as it assesses progress on reforms, rule of law, judicial independence and other membership requirements. The report is likely to attract significant political and media attention in Tirana, with government representatives highlighting progress towards membership and opposition actors focusing on shortcomings in governance, corruption and institutional independence. This creates an opportunity for competing political actors to use the Commission’s findings to reinforce existing narratives about Albania’s progress, political legitimacy and relationship with the EU.
Disinformation actors may portray critical findings as evidence that Brussels is deliberately obstructing Albania’s accession or using reform requirements to interfere in domestic politics. Conversely, positive assessments could be presented as proof that the EU is protecting the government or overlooking corruption and democratic shortcomings in exchange for political alignment. References to judicial reform, protest policing or organised crime may be selectively quoted or taken out of context to portray Albania either as a failed state beyond reform or as a country whose problems have been exaggerated by hostile foreign actors. Fabricated screenshots, misleading translations and unverified claims about secret agreements could further reinforce narratives that the report was politically coordinated to reward allies or punish opponents.
The report could therefore become a focal point for competing narratives about sovereignty, political bias and the credibility of the EU accession process. By reducing a complex assessment of progress and remaining challenges to claims of either complete success or deliberate humiliation, such narratives could deepen political polarisation, weaken trust in independent oversight and undermine public understanding of the reforms required for EU membership.
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Post-election negotiations may fuel narratives of foreign interference
In the second half of October, Bosnia and Herzegovina may see intensified coalition negotiations and diplomatic exchanges following the elections, amid ongoing disputes over state institutions, constitutional authority and the country’s geopolitical orientation. Milorad Dodik’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin adds another dimension to these developments, providing an opportunity for political actors to reinforce competing narratives about the country’s international partnerships. Discussions involving EU institutions, foreign embassies and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) may also draw renewed attention as political parties negotiate governing arrangements and debate reforms linked to European integration.
Claims by hired lobbyists representing Republika Srpska (RS) about alleged Saudi and Israeli interest in its independence, create a high risk of disinformation that frames paid advocacy as official foreign endorsement of secession. Lobbying disclosures reveal that Canadian firm Dickens & Madson received $4 million to pursue independence goals, prompting Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Constitutional Court to ban budget funding for the unconstitutional contract. Disinformation networks are highly likely to weaponize these events, misrepresenting unverified lobbyist assertions as official foreign policy and distorting the court’s narrow financial ruling into a narrative of state-level persecution against the Serb community.
Decision-makers should monitor for fabricated recognition announcements, selective excerpts from lobbying reports, and misleading financial figures designed to validate secessionist movements following the October elections. Because these narratives intersect with sensitive political negotiations, key indicators of stability will include official clarifications from the implicated foreign governments and the domestic enforcement of the court’s funding prohibition. Legitimate scrutiny of public spending must be clearly communicated to prevent bad actors from recasting constitutional enforcement as hostility toward an entire community.
The disclosures also intersect with political negotiations after the 4 October elections and competing portrayals of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international partnerships. An earlier BiEPAG analysis published in March explains how international contacts and sanctions relief can be used for political legitimation.
A key risk is that contradictory narratives reinforce one another: some portray Western actors as controlling Bosnia and Herzegovina, while others present Russia as the only power capable of protecting local interests. Both frames can reduce complex political and constitutional questions to a geopolitical struggle, leaving less room for debate about domestic accountability, institutional performance and policy choices. Misleading diplomatic quotes, fabricated leaks, decontextualised footage and unverified claims of election manipulation could further amplify these narratives. By exploiting frustration with political deadlock and the country’s complex constitutional system, such messaging could deepen ethnic polarisation, undermine trust in democratic institutions and international mediation, and weaken support for EU-oriented reforms.
Kosovo: Presidential deal and Specialist Chambers dispute may fuel anti-Western narratives
Kosovo’s presidential election and the debate over amendments to the law governing the Kosovo Specialist Chambers in The Hague have brought constitutional stability, wartime memory and relations with international partners into the same political debate. On 7 October, the Assembly elected Justina Shiroka Pula as president, avoiding snap parliamentary elections. The vote followed a political agreement between the ruling Vetëvendosje movement and the opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), which was linked to proposed changes to the legal framework governing the Specialist Chambers. The amendments sparked controversy and public protests, while international actors raised concerns about their potential implications for the court’s work.
These developments may provide material for disinformation actors seeking to portray Kosovo’s institutions as politically compromised or subject to external control. The agreement surrounding the presidential election could be framed as evidence of a secret bargain between political parties, while the proposed changes to the court’s legal framework may be presented as a necessary defence of Kosovo’s wartime legacy against a foreign-imposed institution. Conversely, criticism from international officials could be portrayed as proof that Western partners are interfering in Kosovo’s sovereignty or attempting to dictate domestic decisions. Selective quotations, misleading claims about the legal consequences of the amendments and accusations of betrayal against political figures who disagree could further amplify these narratives.
By connecting constitutional politics with the emotionally charged legacy of the 1998–99 war, such narratives could deepen political polarisation, undermine trust in democratic institutions and judicial accountability, and strain public confidence in Kosovo’s relations with international partners. The key risk is that complex political and legal disputes are presented as evidence of a single attempt to undermine Kosovo, blurring the distinction between legitimate political disagreement, judicial accountability and unverified claims of foreign interference.
Montenegro: EU accession consultations may fuel “EU betrayal” narratives
Montenegro’s EU accession process is likely to generate increased political attention in October as the country continues discussions on accession benchmarks, reforms and possible future action plans. As a country often presented as a frontrunner in the Western Balkans, any new engagement with EU institutions may be interpreted domestically as either evidence of progress or another delay in the accession process. This environment could provide opportunities for disinformation actors to portray EU enlargement as a political process in which Brussels makes promises without delivering concrete membership prospects. Existing political disputes in Montenegro, including disagreements surrounding Parliament Speaker Andrija Mandić, could further provide material for these narratives by connecting domestic political tensions with the country’s European integration process.
Disinformation actors may frame consultations, reform benchmarks or any lack of concrete progress as evidence that the EU is deliberately “stringing Montenegro along” and has no genuine intention of admitting the country. The Mandić dispute could be incorporated into this narrative through claims that the EU rewards “compliant” governments while punishing pro-Serbian or sovereignty-oriented political actors. At the same time, rule-of-law and institutional reform requirements could be portrayed as political tools designed to remove or weaken particular domestic actors rather than as part of the accession process. Other narratives may claim that EU demands require Montenegro to surrender its sovereignty, identity or traditional values, while reported or leaked documents could be misrepresented as evidence of secret conditions imposed by Brussels. If consultations produce limited or ambiguous results, these narratives could be amplified to portray Montenegro as having been repeatedly deceived or humiliated by the EU.
The combination of genuine political disagreements, technical accession discussions and uncertainty over the pace of enlargement could therefore allow separate issues to be connected into a broader “EU betrayal” narrative. Such claims could deepen existing political divisions over Montenegro’s strategic orientation, weaken public trust in the accession process and undermine support for reforms linked to EU membership.
North Macedonia: October holidays may fuel historical revisionism and anti-EU narratives
North Macedonia’s two October holidays, October 11, Day of the People’s Uprising against Fascism in WW2, and October 23, Day of the Macedonian Revolutionary Struggle, may provide focal points for Bulgaria-related disinformation narratives in North Macedonia. The main risk is that grievances over history, identity and perceived injustice related to the dispute are used to mobilise anti-EU sentiment, portraying Sofia as a proxy for an EU that does not want the country as a member. Speculation about additional Bulgarian demands being added to the negotiating framework could reinforce this message, despite EU officials identifying constitutional changes as the immediate step needed for negotiations to advance.
EU officials have repeatedly identified the constitutional amendment adding Bulgarians to the preamble as the immediate requirement for the accession process to advance. European Council President António Costa reiterated the need for the agreed amendments in June, while Ursula von der Leyen described the constitutional change on 2 October as the final step before opening the fundamentals cluster. Negotiations were formally opened in July 2022. Confusion over the relationship between bilateral protocols and EU conditionality can fuel speculation that the negotiating framework will be expanded with new Bulgarian demands. Claims that such an expansion has already been adopted need evidence of an actual EU decision; uncertainty about future disputes should not be presented as a change already made by Brussels.
Recent controversies provide concrete material that could be folded into this anti-EU framing, like debunked claims about the transfer of Emperor Samuel’s remains from Greece to Bulgaria, aimed at inflaming competing historical and identity claims asserting hostility to Macedonian heritage and dignity.
The reported departure of dual citizen Iva Mihaylova for Bulgaria, while awaiting trial for a fatal collision risks fueling anti-EU sentiments through unresolved information gaps. Mihaylova claims identity-based persecution, while contradictory institutional reports leave her exact route unverified, creating a narrative vacuum. In the context of the Macedonia-Bulgaria dispute, this ambiguity allows actors to allege institutional collusion or persecution, potentially framing Bulgaria and the EU as complicit in undermining the justice system of North Macedonia.
By linking commemorative events to contemporary political disputes, nationalist narratives could intensify bilateral tensions, deepen domestic polarization and weaken public trust in the EU accession process. The key risk is that complex historical and diplomatic issues are reduced to a choice between protecting national identity and pursuing European integration, leaving less room for informed debate about the country’s history, international commitments and future.
Serbia: Voter-list irregularities likely to fuel election-fraud narratives
Concerns over Serbia’s voter register are likely to provide material for election-related disinformation ahead of the 25 October parliamentary elections. The issue comes amid ongoing preparations for the elections, with the Republic Electoral Commission continuing to determine polling arrangements, including polling stations and voting times abroad.
Recent reporting found that more than 500,000 voters are registered at addresses without a street name or number, including 504 voters registered at Mramorska 11 in Niš, where an informal settlement is located. Other cases involve informal settlements with large numbers of registered voters, including Roma communities. Concerns over voter registration in southern Serbia, particularly in municipalities such as Preševo and Bujanovac, together with questions surrounding diaspora voting, create several points that can be connected and amplified online. Disinformation actors may combine these genuine administrative concerns to construct a broader narrative that the voter register is being deliberately manipulated to predetermine the election. Individual cases of unusually high numbers of registered voters could be presented as evidence of “phantom voters”, while issues involving Roma communities or Albanian-populated areas could be given an ethnic dimension. Changes or decisions concerning voting abroad may similarly be framed as an attempt to suppress particular groups of voters. Rather than focusing on whether individual irregularities require investigation, such narratives may generalise them into claims that the entire electoral process is fraudulent and that election results cannot be trusted. This could contribute to election denial, increase ethnic tensions and further weaken confidence in electoral institutions.
Disinfo Radar: Watch and Warn is a monthly publication, part of the alert system of data-driven early warning of disinformation in the Western Balkans. The Disinfo Radar provides advance warning about anticipated flashpoint events likely to fuel disinformation narratives based on the risk assessment analysis of results of continuous media monitoring and the previous experience with recurring disinformation campaigns. The preparation of Disinfo Radar is supported by AI-assisted tools for monitoring, clustering and drafting support. All assessments and final texts are reviewed by human editors and validated by regional experts.
The information provided by the Disinfo Radar is presented in concise, easy to read format and disseminated via the antidisinfo.net content hub, an email newsletter, and via the most popular social networks in the region.
This publication is an information service produced by Metamorphosis Foundation in cooperation with partner network including International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC), Sbunker, Faktoje.al, and Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM).
This publication is free of charge and must not be sold. The views expressed in the publication are positions of the authors.
