Although Serbian authorities did not necessarily label the ceremony as a formal state funeral, reporting described official and military features around the funeral, including a military escort and attendance by government officials. These elements allowed nationalist actors to portray the funeral not only as a private farewell, but as a form of collective and institutional recognition of a wartime commander finally convicted for some of the gravest crimes committed during the wars of the 1990s. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
At the same time, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers\u2019 first-instance judgment<\/a> against Hashim Tha\u00e7i, Kadri Veseli, Rexhep Selimi and Jakup Krasniqi created a different but related information risk. The cases are not equivalent: Mladi\u0107\u2019s conviction is final, while the Specialist Chambers judgment against the former KLA leaders is a first-instance judgment subject to appeal. A key information risk lies in misrepresenting the court\u2019s findings on individual criminal responsibility and the Joint Enteprise Criminal Enterprise as broader conclusions about the KLA, Kosovo Albanians, or the Kosovo war as a whole. Such framing can blur the distinction between judicial findings concerning specific individuals and wider political or historical narratives, potentially contributing to polarisation and undermining informed public discussion of the judgment. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The regional spread of this pattern was visible beyond Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In North Macedonia, Metamorphosis documented public glorification of Mladi\u0107 by officials linked to the governing majority<\/a>. Reporting Diversity Network also identified the glorification of Ratko Mladi\u0107 in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia<\/a>, while Montenegrin civil-society organisations criticised public condolences and tributes by several pro-Serbian political figures<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n These narratives are likely to remain relevant into October because they connect wartime memory with elections, identity politics, EU accession, trust in international institutions and cross-border political mobilisation. The main risk is not only the repetition of false claims, but the normalisation of a framework in which accountability for crimes is presented as collective humiliation, and court-established facts are blurred through selective memory, whataboutism and victimhood rhetoric.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Albania: KAYO investigation likely to fuel competing narratives over arms trafficking and state accountability<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n Albania\u2019s opposition parties have sought to turn allegations surrounding the state-owned defence company KAYO sh.a. into a parliamentary accountability issue, creating a potential flashpoint for competing disinformation narratives around arms trafficking, corruption and state capture. On 11 September, the Democratic Party, Freedom Party and Alliance for Change formally requested a parliamentary investigative commission<\/a> into KAYO\u2019s activities, including its cooperation agreements, production, import, export and trade of weapons, ammunition and military equipment. The proposed commission would have 15 members and a six-month mandate. The opposition also called for scrutiny of public funds used by the company and alleged links to an international arms-trafficking scheme based on leaked audio recordings. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The issue has already developed into a political and information dispute after the parliamentary majority rejected the request<\/a>. The Conference of Chairpersons concluded that the proposed investigation did not meet the constitutional and legal criteria for establishing a parliamentary commission, arguing that its scope was too broad and did not identify sufficiently specific acts, contracts or alleged violations. The same decision noted that SPAK had initiated verification<\/a> concerning the leaked audio, raising concerns about potential overlap between a parliamentary investigation and an ongoing prosecutorial process. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The combination of leaked material, opposition allegations, competing interpretations of KAYO\u2019s activities and the rejection of the proposed commission creates conditions for information manipulation. One potential narrative may present the allegations of arms trafficking and misuse of public funds as already established facts, despite the claims remaining subject to verification. Conversely, opposing narratives may portray the allegations themselves as entirely fabricated or politically motivated, dismissing the underlying questions before the relevant evidence has been fully examined. The issue may therefore become a flashpoint where genuine political and institutional disputes are mixed with premature conclusions, selective presentation of evidence and misleading claims about the activities of KAYO, the role of public institutions and Albania\u2019s defence and NATO commitments. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Bosnia and Herzegovina: Election-integrity briefings likely to fuel narratives around technology, fraud and voter confidence<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n Election-administration briefings and integrity-focused communications in the weeks ahead of Bosnia and Herzegovina\u2019s 4 October general elections<\/a> are likely to become a flashpoint for narratives questioning the reliability and fairness of the electoral process. The Central Election Commission has been conducting preparations for the introduction of biometric voter identification, ballot scanners and electronic result transmission<\/a>, with election authorities and international partners emphasising electoral integrity and public confidence. A recent OSCE conference<\/a> brought together election officials, civil society, media, academia and international partners to discuss the new technologies and the integrity of the electoral process. The Commission also conducted nationwide mock elections<\/a> on 11 September to test the new technologies, during which some polling stations experienced delays because test ballot papers were not delivered on time<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n These developments could provide fertile ground for competing narratives about election manipulation, technological failures and institutional credibility. Technical problems during testing may be presented as evidence that the new system is incapable of securing the vote, while ordinary technical or administrative difficulties could be amplified into premature claims of organised electoral fraud. Conversely, official assurances about the security of the new technologies may be selectively presented as attempts to dismiss legitimate concerns or scrutiny. The CEC has already stressed compliance with election rules and the prohibition of hate speech during the campaign<\/a>, while recent sanctions against political actors for premature campaigning demonstrate that election-related enforcement is already active. The combination of new voting technology, technical testing, competing political narratives and heightened attention to electoral integrity could increase distrust in election administration and create opportunities for fabricated or misleading claims about the voting process. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Kosovo: Western diplomatic engagement after Tha\u00e7i verdict likely to fuel narratives of international pressure<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n The Kosovo Specialist Chambers\u2019 first-instance judgment<\/a> against former Kosovo President Hashim Tha\u00e7i and three other former KLA leaders is likely to remain a focal point for information manipulation around justice, sovereignty and international pressure. The Specialist Chambers\u2019 trial judgment found all four defendants guilty of war crimes and imposed sentences ranging from 13 to 25 years. The full written judgment has not yet been published, so any assessment of its findings remains necessarily preliminary, with a risk of misinterpretation or incomplete understanding of the court\u2019s reasoning. The verdict was followed by protests in Pristina<\/a>, including incidents near the EULEX mission, while Prime Minister Albin Kurti publicly criticised the judgment and called for it to be challenged on appeal. Against this background, meetings involving Kosovo\u2019s political leadership, the EU and Western diplomatic representatives could focus on restraint, rule of law, protection of international missions and continued cooperation with justice institutions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The combination of the verdict, domestic political reactions and international engagement is likely to generate narratives portraying Western governments and international justice institutions as exerting political pressure on Kosovo. The outreach could be framed as evidence that foreign actors are attempting to dictate Kosovo\u2019s political response, while the Specialist Chambers and EULEX<\/a> may be portrayed as instruments targeting Kosovo Albanians or seeking to delegitimise the KLA\u2019s role in Kosovo\u2019s independence. Such narratives could also connect calls for restraint with claims that international actors are protecting political interests, or attempting to weaken Kosovo leaders in the diplomatic confrontation with Serbia. Conversely, genuine criticism of the verdict and concerns about the role of international institutions could be mixed with fabricated claims about diplomatic coordination or foreign interference. The information environment is therefore likely to contain a mixture of documented political disagreement, legitimate criticism, and potentially misleading or manipulated narratives, particularly around the meaning of the verdict, the role of EULEX and the response of Western governments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Montenegro: EU-accession pause claims and economic-populism narratives likely to fuel polarisation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n Montenegro\u2019s information in September faces risks concerning disputed reporting that several EU member states sought a pause in Montenegro\u2019s accession negotiations. The EU Delegation in Podgorica denied the claims<\/a>, saying that media allegations that certain EU member states requested a halt in negotiations were unfounded. Even when denied, such claims may feed Eurosceptic narratives that Montenegro\u2019s EU path is blocked, that EU support is unreliable, or that accession is being delayed by hidden political conditions. Conversely, government-aligned actors may use the controversy to portray critics as politically motivated or as aligned with external efforts to undermine Montenegro\u2019s European path. <\/p>\n\n\n\n A second risk concerns Prime Minister Milojko Spaji\u0107\u2019s \u201cEuro Model\u201d wage and pension proposal<\/a>. Supporters may frame the proposal as evidence of social protection, economic optimism and pro-European modernisation. Critics and economists, however, may present it as fiscally irresponsible or as pre-election populism, especially if public discussion focuses on possible budgetary gaps without clear fiscal analysis. This creates space for exaggerated claims on both sides: either that Montenegro is heading toward fiscal collapse, or that all criticism of the proposal is politically motivated obstruction. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Together, disputed EU-accession reports and economic-policy claims may deepen polarisation around Montenegro\u2019s European orientation, institutional credibility and the government\u2019s capacity to manage reform and public finances. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n North Macedonia: October EU enlargement discussion likely to fuel \u201cshifting goalposts\u201d and anti-EU narratives<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n The European Council\u2019s planned strategic discussion on enlargement and reforms<\/a> in October 2026 is likely to become a flashpoint for disinformation narratives surrounding North Macedonia\u2019s stalled EU accession process. The European Council confirmed in June that EU leaders will hold a strategic discussion on enlargement and reforms at their October meeting. North Macedonia remains a candidate country, with accession negotiations formally opened in 2022 and the screening process completed in December 2023. However, the country has not yet adopted the constitutional amendments linked to the 2022 EU negotiating framework. European Council President Ant\u00f3nio Costa stated during his visit to Skopje that adopting the necessary constitutional amendments remains the way forward<\/a> toward formally starting negotiations, while Foreign Minister Tim\u010do Mucunski has stated that there are no constitutional changes in the current context<\/a> without additional trust, credibility and guarantees. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Statements, conclusions or deliberate ambiguities emerging from the October discussion could be exploited to reinforce narratives that the EU is continually changing the conditions for North Macedonia\u2019s accession or deliberately keeping the country outside the Union. One potential frame will portray the enlargement process as a series of \u201cshifting goalposts,\u201d arguing that North Macedonia is being subjected to ever-changing bilateral demands despite fulfilling its obligations. Another may present the EU as attempting to pressure the country into constitutional changes or further concessions at the expense of national sovereignty. Conversely, statements emphasising the merit-based nature of enlargement could be selectively presented as evidence that North Macedonia is solely responsible for the stalled process, potentially intensifying domestic political polarisation. The combination of a genuine unresolved political dispute, high public sensitivity around the EU accession process and uncertainty over the next steps creates an environment in which official statements can be selectively quoted, distorted or combined with fabricated claims about EU intentions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n These EU-accession narratives may also intersect with wider regional identity disputes, including the spread of war-memory narratives and the public glorification of Ratko Mladi\u0107 by some pro-Serbian political actors in North Macedonia<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Serbia: Student-led electoral campaign likely to trigger delegitimisation, foreign-interference and election-integrity narratives<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n As Serbia\u2019s student-led opposition movement campaigns ahead of the scheduled 25 October parliamentary elections<\/a>, its growing political visibility is likely to generate a wider set of delegitimising narratives. The \u201cStudent List \u2013 Students Win\u201d was officially proclaimed as an electoral list<\/a> by the Republic Electoral Commission. Current attacks may claim that the list is not genuinely student-led, that it is controlled by opposition politicians, that it has no programme beyond opposition to the government, or that its representatives are avoiding direct political confrontation. These narratives may later be combined with familiar claims portraying students and civic actors as financed, coordinated or strategically directed by Western governments, NGOs, foreign media, embassies or intelligence services, framing demands for electoral reform as a cover for a broader regime-change operation. Such narratives would exploit longstanding sensitivities around national sovereignty, NATO and perceived foreign pressure, while seeking to undermine the legitimacy of student political participation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, the electoral environment is likely to produce competing narratives around the use of state and institutional resources by the ruling establishment. President Aleksandar Vu\u010di\u0107 and senior Serbian Progressive Party officials are actively campaigning ahead of the snap elections, with the SNS publicly announcing campaign activities and rallies. Serbian election-monitoring organisation CRTA documented irregularities and concerns during the candidacy process<\/a>, while reporting by the media highlighted difficulties experienced by the student movement and opposition actors in accessing notaries and municipal certifiers needed to collect and certify signatures. These documented concerns could become the basis for competing narratives about the fairness of the electoral process. Misleading or fabricated claims may be layered onto genuine disputes over electoral conditions, creating an information environment in which both the student movement and electoral institutions could become targets of delegitimising narratives. <\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n Disinfo Radar: Watch and Warn<\/strong> is a monthly publication, part of the alert system of data-driven early warning of disinformation in the Western Balkans. The Disinfo Radar provides advance warning about anticipated flashpoint events likely to fuel disinformation narratives based on the risk assessment analysis of results of continuous media monitoring and the previous experience with recurring disinformation campaigns. The preparation of Disinfo Radar is supported by AI-assisted tools for monitoring, clustering and drafting support. All assessments and final texts are reviewed by human editors and validated by regional experts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The information provided by the Disinfo Radar is presented in concise, easy to read format and disseminated via the antidisinfo.net content hub, an email newsletter<\/a>, and via the most popular social networks in the region.<\/p>\n\n\n This publication is an information service produced by Metamorphosis Foundation<\/a> in cooperation with partner network including International and Security Affairs Centre (ISAC)<\/a>, Sbunker<\/a>, Faktoje.al<\/a>, and Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM)<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This publication is free of charge and must not be sold. The views expressed in the publication are positions of the authors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" WESTERN BALKANS WATCH AND WARN: War-memory narratives, contested justice and victimhood politics Wartime accountability remains one of the most sensitive and easily manipulated narrative fields in the Western Balkans. Trends visible from August into September show that Ratko Mladi\u0107\u2019s death and funeral in Serbia revived long-standing denial, relativisation and glorification narratives around the Srebrenica genocide […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[166,94,1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-20991","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-active-projects","category-news","category-uncategorized"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.cedem.me\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png\")
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