



ISSN 1801-5669

Centar za demokratiju  
i ljudska prava


Center for Democracy  
and Human Rights

George Washington Boulevard 51, 3145  
81000 Podgorica, Montenegro  
phone: ++382 81 294 114, fax: ++382 81 294 368  
e-mail: [cedem.web@cg.yu](mailto:cedem.web@cg.yu), [www.cedem.cg.yu](http://www.cedem.cg.yu)

# NEWSLETTER

No 20 • March - June 2007







## MONTENEGRO: A MIRACLE IN THE BALKANS?

**Author:**  
Ph.D Srdjan Darmanovic

Journal of Democracy



One of the most widely read and cited publications on  
the problems of and prospects for democracy around the world

When 55.5 percent of the citizens of Montenegro voted on 21 May 2006 to sever the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SCG) and make their republic a fully sovereign country in its own right, they set the capstone on a political shift that has been noteworthy for its peaceful and orderly conduct in a region which has seen a great deal of chaos and bloodshed since the breakup of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s. During that decade, the former Yugoslav federal units of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina had become independent mostly by means of armed clashes, often with fearful consequences for noncombatants who found themselves caught in the strife or targeted on grounds of communal hatred.

Montenegro, the smallest of the former Yugoslav republics, has escaped this sad and sanguinary pattern<sup>1</sup>. It has become indepen-

<sup>1</sup> In the Republic of Montenegro there are currently slightly fewer than 700,000 inhabitants, while the capital city of Podgorica has a population of somewhat less than 200,000. Although Montenegro consists mainly of forest-clad mountains (from which it derives its Venetian-coined name), it also possesses slightly more than

dent without crisis or violence, and indeed via a process that excluded the use of force even as a possibility. The independence referendum passed peacefully, like any ordinary election. Despite its close outcome (55 percent had been required for independence to succeed), the result was swiftly recognized, if not formally then in fact by all local and international entities with an interest in the decision.

How did Montenegrin citizens achieve this? It is not as if the question of independence is a minor one. On the contrary, for the last 15 years, it has formed the republic's main political divide, pitting statehood supporters against those favoring retention of the SCG. Many foreign observers, remembering the tragedies of the post-Yugoslav wars, spoke of a "miracle in the Balkans." In fact, however, there was no miracle at all.

Five reasons go far toward explaining the placid, transparent, and democratic nature of Montenegro's transition to fully separate

a hundred kilometers of Adriatic coastline, and hence may be regarded as not only a Balkan but a Mediterranean country.

sovereignty: 1) Since the beginning of the 1990s, the pro-independence position had steadily gained support until it had become the preference of the majority;

2) there were no extremist parties;

3) after fifteen years of contention over the statehood issue, a consensus had formed behind the idea that a democratic vote was the best way to resolve it;

4) in Serbia, the other party most directly interested, a democratic government had arisen to replace the aggressive dictatorship of the late Slobodan Milosevic; and

5) the European Union (EU) was taking a highly visible role in helping to legitimize the referendum by verifying it as a true expression of the will of Montenegro's voters.

As I have previously explained in these pages<sup>2</sup>, the statehood issue was a perennial problem in post-Yugoslav Montenegro. The question came up over and over again as every internal, regional, or international crisis in which Montenegro found itself involved invited a rethinking of how the republic's status should be defined. This problem was dominant even during the 1990s, as Montenegro was beginning to work its way through what can actually be seen as two transitions.

In the first transition period, which lasted from 1990 to 1997, the political leadership that took over by surfing the wave of Milosevic's populist movement decided, albeit not without hesitation, to remain within a two-member federation with Serbia that

2 Srdjan Darmanovic, "The Dilemmas of a Small Republic," *Journal of Democracy* 14 (January 2003): 145-54.

was called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). In order to gain something resembling a popular mandate for this policy, Montenegrin officials held an antiindependence referendum on 1 March 1992, even as fighting was raging in other parts of the former SFRY. At that time, 62 percent of those voting opted for staying with Serbia, while independence supporters staged a boycott which, together with a "natural" abstention rate of about 10 percent, resulted in about a third of the electorate staying away from the polls<sup>3</sup>.

Although the 1992 referendum was legally and procedurally dubious (there were no international monitors), it was clear that the proindependence camp was in the minority. It comprised mainly the antiwar opposition parties; some independent media, NGOs, and intellectuals; and most significantly, members of minorities such as Croats, Albanians, Bosniaks, and other Muslims, all of whom together make up slightly less than a fifth of the population.

The second transition period began when Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic and his Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS), upset by Milosevic's authoritarianism and the potential international costs of being associated with his rule, began to shift toward a policy of independence from Belgrade and its dictator. Montenegro's government began taking over function after function from the federal level. In November 1999, the republic abandoned the Yugoslav dinar and adopted the German mark as its official currency, setting up an automatic switch

3 Veselin Pavicevic, *Elections and Electoral Systems in Montenegro 1990-1996* (Podgorica: CID, 1997).

to the euro at the beginning of 2002. With the local political elite putting wind in its sails, independence had begun its journey toward majority approval. From the time of NATO's armed intervention against Serbia in the first half of 1999 right up through the May 2006 vote, all opinion surveys and election results confirmed that a stable though not overwhelming majority of Montenegrins favored independence<sup>4</sup>.

Although Milosevic's aggression and high-handedness played a role in driving pro-independence sentiment, his fall in October 2000 and the coming to power of a democratic regime in Belgrade did not remove the structural question facing the people of Montenegro: Could their tiny Adriatic republic of fewer than three-quarters of a million people be an equal partner with a country seventeen times its size?

The Montenegrin government suggested a "velvet divorce" on the Czechoslovak model, with the difference that Montenegro and Serbia would sign a document associating them with each other in a fashion reminiscent of the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States or the EU. Montenegro's main protectors, the United States and the EU, took a dim view of this proposal, as did Belgrade. Washington and Brussels favored no change in the regional status quo that had come into being after NATO's bombing campaign and the June 1999 adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which made Serbia's majority-

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<sup>4</sup> These trends can be found in Center for Democracy and Human Rights (CEDEM) brochures titled *Public Opinion in Montenegro 2000* and *Public Opinion in Montenegro 2001*

Albanian southern province of Kosovo an international protectorate.

At this stage, the EU launched a strong initiative to put the relationship between Montenegro and Serbia on a wholly fresh basis. The upshot was the March 2002 Belgrade Agreement, which envisioned the new SCG as a union of two semi-independent states. The Constitutional Charter that was agreed to in the accord provided that after three years either member state could opt out via referendum, making this probably the first case in the history of modern constitutionalism to involve such a "temporality" clause. This clause would serve as a key part of the legal grounding for the 2006 referendum. With popular majorities in Montenegro lining up consistently behind independence, the years from the NATO war and Milosevic's fall to the referendum may be said to have been a period of temporary blockage, when the supervening EU interest in the stability of Europe's most troubled region impeded for a time the Montenegrin desire for full sovereignty.

### **The EU Steps In**

The SCG was to a large degree the brainchild of EU high commissioner for foreign affairs Javier Solana—indeed, wags often called it "Solanaland." Both that official and his employer did what they could to promote the SCG's perpetuation, pointing out that the fastest route to European integration for both Serbia and Montenegro lay in union rather than fission. The ruling



coalition in Montenegro was determined to press forward with a vote on independence once three years had passed, however, which meant that the most urgent issue was how to devise rules for the referendum upon which all sides could agree. Various European bodies and organizations—including the Council of Europe Commission for Democracy through Law (or Venice Commission), on which I sit—took active roles in trying to solve this problem.

The Venice Commission's contribution was to study the Canadian experience with the 1995 Quebec-sovereignty referendum, including the recommendations made by the Supreme Court of Canada. Our chief suggestion, offered in December 2005, was that the legitimacy required to underwrite a decision on such an important matter would be best ensured by requiring that any change in status pass by a figure, larger than a simple majority, that the two sides should

agree on between themselves.

The mediation provided by the EU turned out to be vital, for it was clear that the two sides of the independence question would not by themselves be able to agree on the ground rules for holding the referendum, let alone the precise majority needed for independence to succeed. Solana's handpicked mediators were a pair of Slovak diplomats with Yugoslav experience, Miroslav Lajcak and Frantisek Lipka. The former would play a key role in setting the required threshold for "yes" votes at 55 percent, while the latter would be appointed on behalf of the EU to serve as president of the Mon-

tenegrin Electoral Commission (RRK). In this capacity, he was authorized to cast the "golden" or tiebreaking vote when the other RRK principals split—a role that would become crucial in certifying both the voting process and its result. As the short negotiation process moved forward, the EU offered the contending sides a highly unusual electoral model on a "take it or leave it" basis.

The threshold majority for passage would be set at 55 percent of those actually casting valid votes. (Montenegro's own referendum law already required that any referendum had to attract the participation of at least 50 percent of all registered voters in order to be valid.) The EU's proposal would mean that the pro-independence forces would need to win by at least 10 percentage points in order to attain their goal of splitting from Serbia. There are no recent precedents for such a requirement. Internationally, the practice regarding independence referenda has been

to require only a simple majority and to add no demands regarding turnout.

In sports terms, the EU's preferred rules would mean a handicap match in which the "no" side would enjoy a 10 percent edge. Yet Prime Minister Djukanovic and his pro-independence bloc, showing a strong grasp of political reality and not wanting to cross the EU<sup>5</sup>, said yes to these conditions. The unionist bloc, believing a 55 percent majority to be out of their opponents' reach, gladly did the same.

In hindsight, the EU's 55 percent threshold looks like a smart choice. It forestalled a unionist boycott, promoted high mobilization on both sides of the issue, and bolstered the legitimacy of the eventual result. Yet it represented a huge risk. Had independence fallen just short—and a swing of but a few thousand votes would have been all that was needed—an electoral majority would have found itself on the losing side while the SCG would have suffered a total loss of legitimacy, presenting the politicians of Serbia, Montenegro, and the EU with a sticky problem indeed. Thus it seems hard to believe that the EU will use the Montenegrin case as a model, even if things worked out in the end. The campaign period leading up to the May 2006 referendum saw a clash of views on more than just the question of statehood. Instead, differences over basic values divided the two contending sides. The pro-independence block comprised

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<sup>5</sup> The OSCE chairman warned that unless "European standards" (including presumably the 55 percent threshold) were followed, the OSCE would probably withhold its monitoring efforts. This amounted to a threat to deprive the referendum of its international legitimacy.

a multiethnic coalition that included not only the vast majority of those who identify themselves as ethnically Montenegrin (such people make up just over 43 percent of the republic's total population, according to the 2003 census) but all the national minorities as well. At its head stood the parties that had formed the backbone of the opposition to Milosevic in the second half of the 1990s. The pro-independence electoral base held values that harmonized with those of Western-style liberal democracy, and favored membership in the EU and NATO, full cooperation with the Hague warcrimes tribunal that had been trying Milosevic at the time of his death in March 2006, and tolerance across ethnocommunal lines<sup>6</sup>.

The unionist base lay among the ethnic Serbs (about 32 percent of the population) and a minority of ethnic Montenegrins. The leading unionist parties had been allies of the Milosevic regime, relying significantly on political and, it seems, even financial support from the Serbian government or its political allies. The value orientation of unionist voters corresponded to the authoritarian patterns found in postcommunist societies. Of special note was the influence exerted by certain highly conservative clerics from the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Although the referendum represented a clash of worldviews or perhaps even of two worlds within the same society, there was no real potential for significant violence. Neither bloc contained an antisystem party or a party given to extreme tactics. The winning coalition was a group of moderate pro-  
<sup>6</sup> See CEDEM's surveys from 2000 till the present at [www.cedem.cg.yu](http://www.cedem.cg.yu)

independence parties that never favored any method except orderly democratic voting. The unionist bloc had former Milosevic allies, but none of them was like the ultrarightist Serbian Radical Party in Serbia proper. After Milosevic's fall, some of the pro-Serbian parties in Montenegro changed leaders and began expressing a newfound appreciation for Europe and the "European rules of the game," among which was the imperative to decide the statehood issue in a peaceful, democratic way. Unionists who might have been prone to violent imaginings could find no powerful sponsors. Milošević was out of the picture, behind bars at The Hague and headed for a fatal heart attack. The new Serbian government under Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica backed the unionists in various ways, but it stopped short of adventurism or any attempt to reprise the tragic 1990s.

### **A Calm Campaign**

By the standards of Montenegrin elections, the referendum campaign actually caused fewer sparks than normal. Electioneering intensified about ten days before the vote, but only modestly. Both blocs followed the rules of modern political marketing, with the heaviest stress on the "ground game" of door-to-door canvassing aimed at reaching every voter in this city-sized country. Turnout was sky-high at 86.5 percent, which shows that between them the two camps had done an excellent job of motivating citizens to vote and thereby had lent legitimacy to the result, whatever it might be.

In the end, the roulette ball stopped at 55.5 percent in favor of independence. Statehood had been won with a margin of about 45,000 votes. More than 3,000 observers from the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and an array of local and foreign NGOs attested that the contest had been a fair one, conducted in an atmosphere of peace and without significant irregularities. When the result became public, the disappointed unionists (backed silently by the Serbian government) began crying foul, even though all the representatives from the "no" side had signed the polling-station minutes without complaint. The unionists had the ground cut out from under them by the clear findings of the RRK and the OSCE; statements accepting the vote from the EU, the Council of Europe, and the governments of Russia, China, the United States, and many other countries; and the UN's speedy seating of Montenegro as a full-fledged member state. The unionist parties have since backed away from their early stance of denial, but their initial attitude is a sign that political divisions will endure in sovereign Montenegro.

The first parliamentary elections, held on 10 September 2006, drove this point home quickly. Once again, the two blocs faced off against each other, though this time the issue was not whether there would be a sovereign state, but rather who would run it. The voters kept the DPS in power at the head of a tellingly named Coalition for a European Montenegro. With the referendum battle still fresh in everyone's mind, polarization was predictably intense. This should ease over time, however, since the massive issue that spurred it is now off the table.

The big surprise was Djukanovic's an-

nouncement, made shortly after the September voting, that he would retire from politics after seventeen years. He explained that he had had his turn, and that the country needed new faces. Yet he is only 45 years old, so it will be interesting to see not only how his coalition will handle the question of leadership succession under new premier Zeljko Sturanovic, but also whether a Djukanovic comeback might be in the cards someday.

Three weeks after the May referendum, Serbia recognized Montenegro as an independent state. The two have since been reordering their relations, which one may expect will be generally good. Serbia's President Boris Tadic was the first "foreign" leader to pay a state visit to Montenegro's capital of Podgorica, where he avowed his desire for the closest ties between the two states. Unpublicized but special ties remain not only between the governments, but even more between the peoples of the two countries.

There are myriad personal bonds, and systematic cooperation in areas such as the economy, scientific research, culture, and transport has been well developed for some time. This should continue, perhaps even more smoothly than was the case under the old SCG. We must of course bear in mind that nationalism still dominates Serbian politics, and be aware that some future Serbian government might seek to stir up trouble in Montenegro by means of parties that appeal to those Montenegrins who identify themselves as Serb coethnics. At present, however, this scenario must be gauged as less likely than one that envisions smooth relations between Podgorica and Belgrade. The May 2006 Montenegrin referendum

means that all the republics of communist strongman Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia (Tito died in 1980) have now become independent and internationally recognized states. Yet the process of fission will most likely go on, since under UNSCR 1244 the province of Kosovo seems headed for either full or conditional independence from Serbia.

Montenegrin independence, however, is not linked to this process. A country of its size is a threat to no one; neither can it disturb the wider regional constellation. It has no border issues, it enjoys friendly relations with its neighbors, and the status of the minority communities who make up part of its citizenry is very good. In December 2006, the Partnership for Peace organization admitted Montenegro, which is now eager to join NATO at the earliest possible date (probably 2010). All relevant political forces in Montenegro favor the path of integration with Europe and eventual EU membership. On the morrow of its newly gained independence, Montenegro looks north and westward, ready to go where most of the emerging postcommunist states of Europe have trod.

(article published in the *Journal of Democracy*<sup>7</sup>)

<sup>7</sup> Journal of Democracy is a leading world scientific magazine in the area of political science, published by John Hopkins, Washington DC. The editors of the magazine are Marc F. Plattner and Larry Diamond. The members of American editorial committee are Francis Fukuyama, Donald L. Horowitz, Samuel P. Huntington, Arend Lijphart, Juan Linz, Adam Przeworski and Alfred Stepan. Some of the members of the international editors committee are Zbigniew Brzezinski, Vaclav Havel, Seymour Martin Lipset and Adam Michnik. Detail presentation of the magazine could be found at : [www.journalofdemocracy.org](http://www.journalofdemocracy.org)

**CEDEM**
**Empirical Research Department**
**The attitudes toward Non – governmental organizations  
March – April 2007**

Center for Democracy and Human Rights in cooperation with the Center for Development of NGO sector, and with financial support of the USAUD/ORT, realized the research concerning attitudes toward NGO sector in Montenegro.

Having in mind that, there are over 3800 registered NGO's and foundations in Montenegro which deal with the different issues in society, CRNVO is continuously observing the attitudes Montenegrin citizens have toward NGO's, wishing to recognize the key problems within the NGO sector which at the same time have influence on forming the public opinion toward NGO sector. Therefore, this research is being performed for second year in a row, which enabled the comparative analyses of attitudes toward NGO's, too.

**Citizens awareness concerning NGO activities**

Awareness	DAMAR 2006 (%)	CEDEM 2007 (%)
Informed (totally, very good, well informed)	19.1	25.5
Partially informed	41.7	38.1
Not enough informed	20.2	20.6
Non informed	13.9	10.6
Not able to evaluate	5.1	5.2

**Confidence in NGO's**

LEVEL OF TRUST	DAMAR 2006 (%)	CEDEM 2007 (%)
High	3.6	8.1
Medium	32.8	34.1
Small	19.8	25.3
No trust	14.4	15.7
Not determined	29.4	16.8

**Whose interests realize NGO?**

INTERESTS	DAMAR 2006 (%)	CEDEM 2007 (%)
Montenegrin citizens and public good	26.0	33.3
NGO leaders	16.8	15.8
Government	8.6	7.6
Political parties	6.8	7.5
Foreign states	4.4	5.3
Can't tell	37.4	30.6


## Ethnic distance in Montenegro April – May 2007

This research is a part of complex project “Minority rights: Legislative and praxis in Montenegro” which is being realized by CEDEM (Center for Democracy and Human Rights), CEZAM (Center for Human and Minority Rights), ASK / LIBERTASK CONSORTIUM and Nansen Dialog Center Montenegro. The project was financed by Foundation Institute for Open Society – Regional office Montenegro and King Baudouin Foundation from Brussels.

**Total distance – overall distribution in % “Yes” responses**

Statements	Montenegrin	Srbs	Bosnians	Albanians	Croats	Roma	American	Frenchman	Russian	German	Englishman	Italian
To live permanently in my country	96.3	91.4	75.0	52.3	63.3	63.3	62.2	68.6	72.9	61.7	66.7	71.1
To live in my neighborhood (the same building or street)	95.8	92.1	71.2	48.0	62.0	52.9	61.6	68.3	71.8	62.3	66.5	70.9
To be my co - worker	94.6	91.3	71.6	47.8	61.6	48.6	60.5	65.7	70.6	61.9	64.7	69.2
To be my superior at work	90.7	84.3	57.5	35.9	46.1	34.5	47.8	51.2	54.8	49.5	51.4	54.1
To be teacher to my children	90.7	94.7	53.4	30.8	45.2	30.1	44.1	48.9	50.3	44.5	49.3	50.4
To visit each other and be friends	96.2	92.7	70.4	44.6	58.4	44.5	59.8	66.3	69.6	60.2	64.3	68.8
To have leading political power position in my country	91.4	78.2	47.3	27.7	31.1	25.8	30.2	32.6	36.5	31.0	32.3	34.2
To be my far relative by means of our relatives marriage	88.5	83.2	45.5	28.0	41.9	22.9	45.7	49.7	53.0	44.2	47.9	52.2
To be my close relative by means of our own or our children marriage	86.0	80.8	36.6	22.3	34.1	17.7	36.8	41.0	44.9	34.5	39.1	44.8

**Total ethnic distance - Trend**



## Public opinion in Montenegro June 2007

This research was conducted in period 01 – 06 June 2007, using standard CEDEM's twofold stratified sample with random selection of interviewees in final units applied, at the level of 1011 interviewees from 9 municipalities (Pljevlja, Berane, Bijelo Polje, Podgorica, Niksic, Cetinje, Herceg Novi, Bar i Ulcinj). Project Political Public Opinion is supported by Foundation Open Society Institute, representative office in Montenegro (OSIM).

Basic characteristics of the sample		Confidence in Institutions			
<b>Age structure of interviewees</b>		<b>K</b>			
	%	Aug	Feb	Jun	
18 - 34 years	34.0	'06.	'07.	'07.	
35 - 54 years	36.4				
over 55 years	28.9				
No answer	0.7				
<b>Nationality of interviewees</b>					
	%				
Montenegrens	44.2	Serbian Orthodox Church	3.35	3.29	3.40
Srbs	33.0	President of Montenegro	2.83	2.69	2.86
Bosnians	4.4	Government of Montenegro	2.72	2.56	2.80
Albanians	4.8	Montenegrin Police	2.68	2.47	2.68
Muslims	8.2	Montenegrin Parliament	2.60	2.96	2.68
Croats	2.4	Montenegrin Judiciary	2.55	2.26	2.57
Other	3.0	Montenegrin Orthodox Church	2.39	2.35	2.55
		Political Parties in Montenegro	2.23	2.16	2.54

### Rating of the politician/public figure - Trends at the level of entire group of interviewees -

Politicians / public figures	December 2005	April 2006	June 2006	August 2006	February 2007	June 2007
Vanja ČALOVIĆ	-	-	-	-	-	3.18
Milo ĐUKANOVIĆ	2.79	3.21	3.18	2.98	2.86	3.09
Filip VUJANOVIĆ	2.67	-	2.96	2.87	2.82	2.99
Željko ŠTURANOVIĆ	-	-	-	-	2.99	3.14
Nebojša MEDOJEVIĆ	3.07	2.97	2.79	2.43	2.93	3.10

Confidence in Politicians/Public figures	
Rating of the politician/ public figure	Average score
1. Vanja ČALOVIĆ	3.18
2. Željko ŠTURANOVIĆ	3.14
3. Nebojša MEDOJEVIĆ	3.10
4. Milo ĐUKANOVIĆ	3.09
5. Filip VUJANOVIĆ	2.99
6. Gordana ĐUROVIĆ	2.86
7. Andrija MANDIĆ	2.51
8. Vujica LAZOVIĆ	2.48
9. Ranko KRIVOKAPIĆ	2.45
10. Srđan MILIĆ	2.27
11. Miodrag ŽIVKOVIĆ	2.18
12. Predrag POPOVIĆ	2.16
13. Ranko KADIĆ	2.15
14. Emilo LABUDOVIĆ	2.04
15. Zoran ŽIŽIĆ	2.01
16. Ferhat DINOŠA	1.88
17. Mehmet BARDHI	1.71
18. Rafet HUSOVIĆ	1.67
19. Vasil SINIŠTAJ	1.65

Comment: Completed opinion poll results could be found on CEDEM's website: [www.cedem.cg.yu](http://www.cedem.cg.yu)

Satisfaction With The Government Of Montenegro		
Answer	%	
	Feb '07	Jun '07
Very dissatisfied	17.6	16.1
Mostly dissatisfied	17.9	18.7
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	44.2	41.8
Mostly satisfied	15.1	18.5
Very satisfied	5.1	5.0

Electoral preference – Committed voters	
Party	%
DPS	41.1
SDP	3.6
SNP	6.1
SNS	12.2
Serbian Radicals	3.0
PZP	22.4
NS	2.3
LPCG	2.8
Other parties	6.5

#### Respecting human rights and freedom of individual

Rigt/Freedom Attitude	Average score
Right to fair lawsuit in reasonable time	2.91
Right to enjoy its own property (restitution, misuse of right to build)	2.78
Women rights (protection at work, right on pregnancy absence, stopping of violence against women)	2.72
Right on privacy (letter protection, other way of communication - phone, fax machine, apartment immunity)	2.66
Freedom to speak (in medias and public places)	2.63
Right on confession	2.31
National minority rights	2.25

**Will the Parliament adopt the new Constitution?**

	Attitudes %
Yes I am sure	19,6
I believe so	29,8
I don't believe so	15,4
No, certainly not	5,8
Can not tell	29,4

**Voting on referendum for the new Constitution**

	Attitudes %
YES	44,0
NO	14,8
Will not take part in referendum	41,2

**Level of corruption**

Institution / area	AS
Customs	7.21
Health service	7.04
Judiciary	6.90
Police	6.85
Municipality services	6.71
Public Prosecutor	6.70
State services	6.64
High education (University)	6.07
Medias (TV, radio, newspapers)	5.88
Sport	5.64
High school system	5.15
Primary school system	4.38

**Name of the language in the official use**

Name of the language	%
Montenegrin	33.3
Serbian	30.70
Montenegrin + Serbian or Serbian + Montenegrini	3.10
Mother tongue	2.50
Other	1.6

**Membership in the European Union (trend)**

	Dec 05	Jun 06	Aug 06	Feb 07	Jun 07
Yes	81.2	81.5	76.5	74.0	78.3
No	4.8	5.5	5.6	8.4	6.5
Doesn't know	14.0	13.0	17.9	17.6	15.2

**Membership in NATO**

	Dec 05	Jun 06	Aug 06	Feb 07	Jun 07
Yes	37.8	44.2	36.9	36.6	32.9
No	35.0	27.3	31.4	34.6	39.7
Doesn't know	27.2	28.5	31.8	28.8	27.4

**Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal**

	Dec 05	Jun 06	Aug 06	Feb 07	Jun 07
Yes	49.7	54.8	50.9	45.3	48.2
No	31.0	28.4	27.4	32.6	30.6
Doesn't know	19.3	16.8	21.7	22.1	21.2

**Montenegrin allies in area of foreign policy**

	Attitudes				
	Absolutely not	A little	Yes significantly	Yes, absolutely	Can not tell
EU	9.5	21.7	28.5	30.4	9.9
USA	30.3	28.3	17.4	11.2	12.8
RUSSIA	22.1	29.1	19.8	17.6	11.3
SERBIA	21.2	18.7	16.2	33.5	10.4

*NOTE: 16.1% of interviewees think that Montenegro should not rely on nobody in area of foreign policy.*

# CEDEM Activities

## *Seminar:*

”Seminar for young employees in judiciary”

### *Ulcinj, March 02-03, 2007*

Target group of this seminar were, primarily, young employees in judiciary. Facilitators of the seminar were eminent Montenegrin jurists, Supreme Court’s judges Mrs. Badnjar, Mr. Kojovic, Mr. Stojanovic, Basic Court’s judge, Mrs. Vuksanovic as well as attorney Mrs. Durutovic and coordinator of the Centre for Human Rights, Mr. Bjekovic. They were talking to their young colleagues about importance and implementation of international standards on human rights and freedoms. Seminar was realized with the support of the Balkan Trust for Democracy.



## *Seminar:*

”European integrations - challenge and a goal”

### *Becici, March 07, 2007*



Seminar organized by CEDEM, with support of Konrad Adenauer Stiftung on following topic: *EUROPEAN INTEGRATIONS - CHALLENGE AND A GOAL.*

Facilitators: Amb. Thomas Schmitt , German Ambassador in Montenegro , Amb. Vladimir Philipov, Head of the CoE office in Montenegro, Ms. Marija Kapitanovic, Head of the Cabinet of State Secretary for EU integrations of Croatia, Mr. Savo Kentera, Euro – Atlantic Club of Mon-

tenegro and Mr. Dragan Djuric, expert for European Integrations.

Participants: students of political sciences, economy, law and representatives of the civil society.

*Seminar:*

”Prohibition of discrimination – European standards”

***Becici, April 19-21, 2007***

Seminar on the topic: *Prohibition of discrimination – European standards* for Montenegrin judges, attorneys, prosecutors, representatives of political parties and organizations for disabled persons was organized by CEDEM, AIRE Center from London and OSCE, supported by Foundation Open Society Institute, OSCE, UK Foreign Office, and Westminster Foundation for Democracy.



Facilitators were: Cynthia Morel, Legal Cases Officer, Minority Rights Group, London, Nuala Mole, Director, AIRE Centre, London, MA Sasa Gajin, Faculty of Law, Union University, Belgrade and Fadil Mucic, Executive director, Union of the Blind of Montenegro.

### International conferences CEDEM's representatives took part

**Ph.D. Srdjan Darmanovic*****6 – 13 April 2007, Toronto***

A visit to the University of Toronto and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ottawa.

**Mr Nenad Koprivica*****March 2007, Skoplje***

Balkan Human Rights network assembly (BHRN).

**Ph.D. Milos Besic*****18 – 21 June 2007, Brussels***

King Baudouin Foundation visit concerning work on the project *Minority rights: Legislative and praxis in Montenegro*.

**Nikola Djurovic i Rajko Radevic*****23 June 2007, Sarajevo***

Regional conference organized by Foundation Friedrich Ebert, with the main topic *Civil society, between the state and international community – experiences and perspectives*.

### We were visited by ...

- **Vladimir Shkolnikov, Ph.D.** - Head of Democratization Department (OSCE)
- **Drino Galicic** - Legal Adviser (OSCE)
- **Celeste Scheib Angus** – The Director of International Cooperation, USAID/ORT
- **Claire O’Riordan** – The USAID/ORT Montenegro Advocacy Program (MAP)