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**Political Public Opinion
in Montenegro
2004
- *June* -**

2 / 2004

About the project and report [\[1\]](#)

“**Montenegrin Public Opinion**” is one of the most important CEDEM’s projects. In period from 1999 to 2004, some 20 researches have been conducted. Most of them (15), as separate projects, were related to **political public opinion**. The remaining researches were dedicated to certain reform aspects in Montenegro and they were realized within macro-project “Reforms for Healthy Society” done by NGO network “Action”. USA AID/OTI, Ulof Palme International Center from Stockholm, USA AID/ORT and Montenegrin Open Society Institute all supported CEDEMS’s researches. Research from June 2004, which results are interpreted in this report has been conducted by CEDEM alone. In accordance with its development strategy and activity plan, at the beginning of March/ this year, CEDEM has established *Department for Empiric Researches*. Head of the department is Ph.D. Veselin Pavicevic- political scientist and responsible researcher is Milos Besic- sociologist and methodologist. Department has one full-time expert employee and basic pollsters’ team has eight periodically employed associates. Besides these associates, Ph.D. Srdjan Darmanovic, director of CEDEM is also a part of this analytical team. Open Society Institute Montenegro (OSIM) supported the project Montenegrin Political-Public Opinion in 2004. CEDEM wishes to express gratitude to OSIM for this support and express great pleasure in cooperating with this institution, which in long period had contributed enormously to development of civil society in Montenegro.

OPENING REMARKS

Research of political public opinion in Montenegro was conducted in period 13-21st June 2004, and it represents integral part of regular periodical sounding out of public opinion conducted by CEDEM's Department for Empirical Researches. As customary, in this research we applied standardize and methodologically tested CEDEM's standard two-phase stratified sample with total of 997 interviewees from 9 municipalities: Pjevalja, Berane, Bijelo Polje, Podgorica, Nikšić, Cetinje, Herceg-Novi, Bar and Ulcinj. Basic characteristics of the sample do not deviate significantly from anticipated standards and total error within the sample is 2%. Here is the national structure of the sample:

Nation	N	%
Montenegrin	444	44,5
Serb	340	34,1
Bosnian	41	4,1
Albanian	51	5,1
Muslim	103	10,3
Croat	8	0,8
Others	9	0,9
No respons	1	0,1
Total:	997	100

We may notice that Montenegrin and Serbs are equally overestimated on account of other national groups, but not those important for national structure but primarily regarding residual categories. If we look at age structure of the sample, we may see the following:

Age	N	%
from 18-30 years	322	32,3
31-40 years	229	23,0
41-50 years	191	19,2
51-60 years	124	12,4
over 60 years	131	13,1

In this segment, the sample is slightly “distorted” in favor of younger categories, which are presented a little bit more than their share of the total population. On the other hand, the structure of the sample according to the profession is more than satisfactory:

Profession	N	%
Farmer	20	2,0
Worker	209	21,0

Employee	127	12,7
Expert	34	3,4
Manager	18	1,8
Entrepreneur/owner	66	6,6
Student	82	8,2
Housewife	83	8,3
Pensioner	155	15,5
Unemployed	185	18,6
Other	15	1,5
No response	3	0,3

Farmers, who are depressed at first sight, are surely not underestimated within proportion of town and village population and their relatively small number is explained by the fact that great deal of village population is employed in the industry. Thus, interviewees, whose profession is agriculture and who *de facto* live in the countryside, very often declared themselves as workers.

Based on the analysis of all variables within the sample we may say that all key criteria of the sample representative capacity, which guarantees validity of the research, are present.

POSITIONS REGARDING INSTITUTIONS

We measured the position regarding institutions, according to ordinal scales of Lickert type with five levels. We are talking about assessment scales where interviewees expressed their confidence into Montenegrin institutions as well as institutions of State Union, in five gradation levels. Here we shall present total coefficient of confidence (**K**), which represent arithmetical middle or average value on each ordinal variable. Here is the confidence presented through coefficient and in hierarchical order, from highest to lowest confidence:

<i>Institutions</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>SD</i>
SPC	779	3,68	1,57
ARMY	892	3,06	1,44
MONTENEGRIN PRESIDENT	943	2,57	1,45
POLICE	937	2,51	1,39
PRESIDENT OF UNION SCG	884	2,51	1,30
MONTENEGRIN GOVERNMENT	945	2,48	1,46
CPC	722	2,47	1,62
JUDICIARY	928	2,47	1,31
MONTENEGRIN PARLIAMENT	913	2,40	1,30
PARLIAMENT OF UNION SCG	844	2,33	1,15
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SCG	822	2,31	1,15

N – number of interviewees; **K** – confidence coefficient; **SD** – standard deviation

First of all, we have to pay attention to the fact that different number of interviewees was

calculated when speaking about average ratings. This means that missing interviewees (up to 997 total number of the sample) did not state their opinion for certain categories (institutions). This remark is important because the differences in number of interviewees, which evaluated institutions, is significant and also, although we don't want to speculate with position of those interviewees who didn't want to evaluate certain institutions, there is possibility that their position toward those institutions is mostly negative. This should be seen in light of the fact that more than 200 interviewees did not evaluate two religious institutions (Serbian Orthodox Church-SPC and Montenegrin Orthodox Church- CPC). If these interviewees have negative position regarding these institutions, but didn't want to publicly express that position, then the average rating, which we calculated could be viewed with certain reserve. Nevertheless, it remains that SPC is still the best rated institution, while the Parliament of State Union and Council of Ministers of SCG, according to same criteria are at the end of the line. Worst rated institution in Montenegro is its Parliament and this surely corresponds with fact that interviewees who support the opposition parties negatively rated the institution in which work, the parties representing these citizens, do not participate for some time now. Finally, we should bear in mind that there were no significant changes compared to our previous sounding out of public opinion regarding confidence in institutions.

If we analytically observe survey results regarding confidence in institutions from points of view of different political blocks currently occupying political scene, a statement of ours becomes evident. Here are the results:


INSTITUTION	Pro-government supporters	Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	Supporters of LSCG	Supporters of GZP
Montenegrin president	4,06	1,47	1,66	2,43
Montenegrin Government	4,05	1,39	1,65	2,16
Police	3,71	1,73	1,83	2,20
CPC	3,63	1,34	3,10	2,74
Montenegrin Parliament	3,60	1,55	1,85	2,14
Judiciary	3,56	1,71	1,86	2,19
President of Union SCG	3,02	2,40	1,66	2,38
SPC	2,88	4,74	2,43	3,70
Army of Union SCG	2,87	3,90	2,10	2,77
Council of Ministers of Union SCG	2,58	2,51	1,79	2,04
Parliament of Union SCG	2,54	2,64	1,67	1,96

From demonstrated table one can see that there are significant differences regarding expressed confidence in institutions by various political groupings. While the Montenegrin president and

Montenegrin Government are best rated institutions in perception of pro-government supporters, supporters of pr-Serbian parties have gave best rating to Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC), and the same case is with supporters of Group for Change-GZP, but with difference that they rate this institution much lower. Liberals are interesting, primarily, because they rate much lower all institutions compared to supporters of other groupings and based on that fact we may say that their total dissatisfaction is far greater than those of other groupings supporters. At the same time, among mentioned institutions, they rate most of all Montenegrin Orthodox Church (although even this rating isn't very high). It seems that supporters of Liberals see CPC as symbol of independent Montenegro, and that is reason for its rating.

EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE

In our research, the interviewees judged the Government through perception of its performance or better said- they were expressing satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the work of this institution. Here are the results:



We may see that majority of interviewees are dissatisfied with the work of the Government and that total dissatisfaction is very much similar to results of our April research. On the other hand, satisfaction with Government performance is somewhat smaller and it amounts to increased percentage of those who express neither satisfaction nor dissatisfaction. If we look at analytical data on Government performance through prism of different political groupings, we may see the following:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>Very dissatisfied</i> %	<i>Mostly dissatisfied</i> %	<i>Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied</i> %	<i>Mostly satisfied</i> %	<i>Very satisfied</i> %
Pro-government supporters	4,3	8,2	31,5	40,9	13,6
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	70,3	18,3	9,1	0,5	0,0
Supporters of LSCG	58,5	30,8	6,2	3,1	0,0
Supporters of GZP	37,6	28,7	27,7	1,0	0,0
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	29,8	22,0	34,0	10,6	1,4
Abstainers	38,0	24,5	32,3	4,2	1,0


C (contingency coefficient) = 0.59

Treated link is contingent, what means that there are significant differences between political groupings when evaluating performance of the Government. It can be seen quite clearly that supporters of pro-government parties are mostly satisfied while at supporters of other groupings including abstainers dissatisfaction is dominant feeling. However, there are significant differences in the level of dissatisfaction between these groupings. Supporters of pro-Serbian parties are by far the most dissatisfied while dissatisfaction of other groupings supporters is far less. This comparative example is most evident when you express satisfaction with Government performance through coefficients, i.e. average grades of measured satisfaction, as in evaluating Government performance we used ordinal scale:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>Satisfaction coefficient (average rating)</i>
Pro-government supporters	3,47
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	1,36
Supporters of LSCG	1,51
Supporters of GZP	1,82
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	2,26
Abstainers	2,06

POSITIONS ON MONTENEGRIN INDEPENDENCE

Position on Montenegrin independence is one of unavoidable questions in all soundings out of public opinion conducted in recent years. This issue becomes ever more actual as the end of Belgrade agreement is nearing, after which Montenegrin statehood issue must be resolved. In this research interviewees simply had to declare whether they are for independence of Montenegro. Here are the results:



We may see that, compared to our April research regarding the position on Montenegrin independence, *there hasn't been almost any changes*. Once again, we have equalized number of those in favor of Montenegrin independence and those who prefer the State Union of SCG. As this position has been measured in quite long period, we may say that it has become a kind of disposition and that *it belongs to category of fundamental political positions, which are dividing political tissue of Montenegro on two key political lines*. If we look at position regarding independence from different political groupings supporters' point of view, we may see the following:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>Position %</i>		
	For	Against	No position
Pro-government supporters	73,5	5,7	20,8
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	0,5	93,6	5,9
Supporters of LSCG	75,4	13,8	10,8
Supporters of GZP	39,6	36,6	23,8
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	33,3	29,8	36,9
Abstainers	25,5	42,2	32,2

From this table we may see that, as in surveys we conducted so far, *greatest number of pro-government supporters is in favor of Montenegrin independence, while supporters of pro-Serbian parties are almost entirely for the common state*. We may also see that *even abstainers more support common state than independent Montenegro*. Liberals are traditionally in favor of Montenegrin independence. The greatest change occurred regarding GZP and its position regarding this issue. While the majority of interviewees who support this group in April survey expressed position in favor of common state (41.8% to 33.3%), now somewhat bigger number of

GZP supporters are in favor of independent Montenegro in contrast to supporters of common state (42,2% to 25.5%). *However, this shouldn't be seen as change in GZP supporters position but rather that structure of GZP supporters had changed partially, while the position of entire population remained unchanged. We will demonstrate this when we present results about firmness of the electorate.*

CONFIDENCE IN POLITICIANS AND PUBLIC FIGURES

Confidence in politicians and public figures was measured in the same way as in April survey so the data are absolutely comparable. Interviewees had possibility to evaluate each politician individually on fifth-grade scale and grade 5 represented total confidence while grade 1 meant total lack of confidence. Based on these results we formed average ratings for each politician (public figure) and rated them according to scores. Here are the results:

R	POLITICIAN –PUBLIC FIGURE	PO	SD
1	NEBOJŠA MEDOJEVIÆ	3,00	1,38
2	AMFILOHIJE RADOVIÆ	2,87	1,67
3	SVETOZAR MAROVIÆ	2,65	1,40
4	FILIP VUJANOVIÆ	2,63	1,43
5	MILO ĐUKANOVIÆ	2,61	1,62
6	MIODRAG ŽIVKOVIÆ	2,45	1,33
7	BORIS TADIÆ	2,27	1,32
8	SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIÆ	2,26	1,64
9	RANKO KRIVOKAPIÆ	2,19	1,40
10	VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA	2,18	1,35
11	VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ	2,18	1,54
12	DRAGAN ŠOÆ	2,14	1,23
13	ZORAN ŽIŽIÆ	2,06	1,32
14	MIROLJUB LABUS	2,02	1,16
15	ANDRIJA MANDIÆ	1,99	1,23
16	BOŽIDAR BOJOVIÆ	1,97	1,20
17	PREDRAG BULATOVIÆ	1,95	1,18

R - rank; **PO** – average rating; **SD** – standard deviation

Nebojša Medojeviæ, as in April survey, is the best rated politician/public figure and his average rating is somewhat higher than in April survey. On the other hand, Predrag Bulatoviæ continues to lose confidence although in April survey he was rated very low. Amfilohije Radoviæ compared to April survey moved from third to second place by rating, and even his average grade is somewhat higher. Actual Montenegrin Prime Minister received slightly lower rates and that reflected his position on popularity scale. This grade corresponds with lower ratings of the

Government performance. On the other hand, Svetozar Maroviæ has increased his rating compared to April survey. Somewhat better rating of Boris Tadiæ is probably direct reflex of Serbian elections, as our survey was conducted in-between two electoral rounds in Serbia when participants of the second round were already known. **If we look at rating from pro-government supporters' point of view**, we may see the following:

<i>R</i>	<i>POLITICIAN –PUBLIC FIGURE</i>	<i>PO</i>	<i>SD</i>
1	MILO ĐUKANOVIÆ	4,41	0,94
2	FILIP VUJANOVIÆ	3,94	1,03
3	RANKO KRIVOKAPIÆ	3,60	1,23
4	SVETOZAR MAROVIÆ	3,33	1,36
5	NEBOJŠA MEDOJEVIÆ	3,00	1,26
6	BORIS TADIÆ	2,56	1,36
7	AMFILOHIJE RADOVIÆ	2,30	1,44
8	MIROLJUB LABUS	2,13	1,17
9	MIODRAG ŽIVKOVIÆ	1,88	1,07
10	VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA	1,77	1,02
11	PREDRAG BULATOVIÆ	1,67	0,96
12	DRAGAN ŠOÆ	1,66	0,96
13	ZORAN ŽIŽIÆ	1,52	0,90
14	ANDRIJA MANDIÆ	1,50	0,81
15	BOŽIDAR BOJOVIÆ	1,50	0,81
16	SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIÆ	1,48	1,05
17	VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ	1,46	0,96

R - rank; **PO** – average rating; **SD** – standard deviation

Thus, although total population rated him somewhat lower, *Milo Đukanoviæ is still undisputed leader in the eyes of pro-government supporters*. Compared to April survey, rating of politicians from pro-government supporters' point of view is almost identical. **Here is the situation regarding supporters of pro-Serbian parties:**

<i>R</i>	<i>POLITICIAN –PUBLIC FIGURE</i>	<i>PO</i>	<i>SD</i>
1	AMFILOHIJE RADOVIÆ	4,29	1,27
2	SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIÆ	3,94	1,45
3	VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ	3,73	1,40
4	ZORAN ŽIŽIÆ	3,45	1,32
5	VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA	3,38	1,29
6	ANDRIJA MANDIÆ	3,17	1,28
7	DRAGAN ŠOÆ	3,06	1,24
8	MIODRAG ŽIVKOVIÆ	3,03	1,23
9	BOŽIDAR BOJOVIÆ	3,02	1,26

10	PREDRAG BULATOVIAE	2,84	1,37
11	NEBOJŠA MEDOJEVIAE	2,83	1,31
12	SVETOZAR MAROVIAE	2,42	1,23
13	BORIS TADIAE	2,09	1,14
14	MIROLJUB LABUS	2,05	1,08
15	FILIP VUJANOVIAE	1,73	,99
16	MILO ĐUKANOVIAE	1,33	,81
17	RANKO KRIVOKAPIAE	1,16	,49

R - rank; **PO** – average rating; **SD** – standard deviation

As in April survey, *first three places are occupied, by one extremely conservative religious leader and two Hague indicts*. Among supporters of pro-Serbian parties, vice president of SNP Zoran Žižia the best rated politician in Montenegro. It should be noted that Predrag Bulatovia, officially the leader of strongest opposition party is rated relatively low by supporters of pro-Serbian parties. The biggest difference compared to April survey occurred regarding rating of Nebojša Medojevia, what means that structure of GZP supporters is changing, or more precisely, it looks as if supporters of pro-Serbian parties are identifying Nebojša Medojevia as person in favor of Montenegrin independence. Speaking about **supporters of LSCG**, politicians rating looks like this:

R	POLITICIAN –PUBLIC FIGURE	PO	SD
1	MIODRAG ŽIVKOVIAE	4,29	1,04
2	NEBOJŠA MEDOJEVIAE	2,80	1,35
3	BORIS TADIAE	1,98	1,24
4	MIROLJUB LABUS	1,82	1,13
5	SVETOZAR MAROVIAE	1,82	1,20
6	DRAGAN ŠOAE	1,77	1,09
7	AMFILOHIJE RADOVIAE	1,75	1,31
8	SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIAE	1,74	1,33
9	MILO ĐUKANOVIAE	1,66	1,05
10	RANKO KRIVOKAPIAE	1,62	,90
11	FILIP VUJANOVIAE	1,57	,97
12	ANDRIJA MANDIAE	1,51	1,00
13	VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ	1,49	1,19
14	PREDRAG BULATOVIAE	1,45	,88
15	BOŽIDAR BOJOVIAE	1,43	,92
16	VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA	1,43	,88
17	ZORAN ŽIŽIAE	1,42	,95

R - rank; **PO** – average rating; **SD** – standard deviation

Miodrag Živkovia is still undisputed leader of liberals. It should also be noted that all other politicians/public figures have quite low average rating in comparison with Živkovia. Still, regarding April survey it should be also noted that average rating of Nebojša Medojevia is higher. This data is completely in line with our finding that firmness of liberal electoral body is reducing

in favor of GZP (we shall demonstrate this later). If we analyze **politicians' ratings from point of view of average GZP supporters' rating** we can see the following:


<i>R</i>	<i>POLITICIAN –PUBLIC FIGURE</i>	<i>PO</i>	<i>SD</i>
1	NEBOJŠA MEDOJEVIÆ	4,47	,78
2	BORIS TADIÆ	2,73	1,45
3	AMFILOHIJE RADOVIÆ	2,65	1,63
4	SVETOZAR MAROVIÆ	2,52	1,38
5	MIODRAG ŽIVKOVIÆ	2,47	1,25
6	FILIP VUJANOVIÆ	2,32	1,14
7	MILO ĐUKANOVIÆ	2,15	1,23
8	MIROLJUB LABUS	2,14	1,25
9	DRAGAN ŠOÆ	2,02	1,06
10	VOJISLAV KOŠTUNICA	1,98	1,25
11	VOJISLAV ŠEŠELJ	1,91	1,41
12	SLOBODAN MILOŠEVIÆ	1,89	1,50
13	RANKO KRIVOKAPIÆ	1,87	1,11
14	ZORAN ŽIŽIÆ	1,80	1,03
15	BOŽIDAR BOJOVIÆ	1,71	,99
16	ANDRIJA MANDIÆ	1,67	,93
17	PREDRAG BULATOVIÆ	1,65	,89

R - rank; **PO** – average rating; **SD** – standard deviation

It is obvious that Nebojša Medojeviæ was recognized among supporters of Group for Change as its leader and thus he received by far the highest score. Still, it is interesting that he is followed by Boris Tadiæ (at that moment candidate for Serbian president) and Amfilohije Radoviæ (best rated politician among supporters of pro-Serbian parties). Finally, if we analyze mutual relative relations within ranking, we may say that politicians' ranking within this supporters group is more or less identical as ranking we obtained in April survey.

POSITIONS ON THE BOYCOTT OF THE PARLIAMENT

As boycott of the Parliament by the opposition parties is still actual, we, just as in April survey, conducted the sounding out of public opinion regarding this kind of opposition parties' behavior. Results of our research are demonstrating as follows:




Comparing the results with April survey one can say that number of those who support the boycott is almost the same. However, the number of those against the boycott has fallen (although the total amount of interviewees is within this category), while the number of those who don't have opinion on this issue has increased for couple percentages. If we look at positions regarding boycott of the Parliament through prism of different political groupings supporters we may see the following:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>POSITION %</i>		
	In favor	Against	No position
Pro-government supporters	2,9	82,8	14,3
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	72,6	7,3	20,1
Supporters of LSCG	47,7	21,5	30,8
Supporters of GZP	17,8	52,5	29,7
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	13,5	30,5	56,0
Abstainers	19,8	30,7	49,5


Even in this respect there are no significant differences compared to April survey. Supporters of pro-government parties are against the boycott while supporters of pro-Serbian parties support the boycott. Speaking about liberals, the number of those who supports the boycott has increased but that number is far smaller compared to supporters of pro-Serbian parties.

ELECTORAL PREFERENCE

Within this research, electoral preference was measured in two ways. First we asked the interviewees for whom would they vote if there would be coalitions in the elections and then, for whom would they vote in case parties would participate at elections individually. Here are the results regarding the coalitions:



Basic finding of this part of the research examining the position of citizens regarding political preference is almost the same as in April survey. It seems that party preference has become integral part of firmly structured positions so big changes here are unlikely to occur unless some serious political changes within Montenegro or in the surroundings happen. GfP seems to have stabilized its positions and in eventual elections, it would probably achieve result on the level of three electoral limits. Here are the results illustrating results in case parties participate in the elections individually:



Thus, as we said, there are no significant changes in comparison with April survey and differences are within limits of statistical sample error. DPS has twice as much supporters compared to all other parties, while SNP and GPZ, with approximately 10% of support are very close to each other regarding parliamentary strength.

FIRMNESS OF ELECTORAL BODY


Firmness of the electoral body is surely one of the more important indicators of political preference stability. Through this indicator, we can identify the *stability of political- electoral behavior of citizens*. Here are the results of this part of the research:

Voted in October 2002	ACTUAL ELECTORAL PREFERENCE %									
	DPS/SDP	SNP/SNS/SRS	LSCG	NS	DSS	NSS	GZP	Other	Undecided	Abstainers
Coalition DPS+SDP	65,6	1,3	1,8	0,0	0,3	0,0	9,3	1,8	7,5	12,6
Coalition SNP+SNS+NS	1,1	65,4	1,6	5,5	1,6	1,6	5,5	2,2	7,7	7,7
LSCG	0,0	0,0	62,9	0,0	0,0	0,0	17,1	1,4	2,9	15,7
Coalition NSS+SRS	0,0	57,1	0,0	0,0	4,8	19,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	19,0
Coalition DSCG+DUA+PDP	12,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	12,0	40,0	16,6	20,0
Other	0,0	0,0	28,6	0,0	0,0	0,0	14,3	57,1	0,0	0,0
Do not remember	4,0	6,1	4,0	2,0	1,0	0,0	16,2	3,0	21,2	42,4
Didn't vote	3,0	12,8	2,0	2,5	2,0	0,5	11,8	2,5	14,3	48,8

Key change respect to previous period is that now 17% of LSCG voters in previous elections would now vote for GZP. In April that percentage was 7%, what means that liberal electoral body has decreased its firmness in favor of GZP, or better said, we have the increase in number of liberal's voters who would, in eventual elections, vote for GZP.

MEMBERSHIP IN EU

Issue of membership in European Union is one of the usual issues we measure. Regarding this issue all interviewees simply answer do they support eventual membership in EU whether we are talking solely about Montenegro or about State Union SCG. Here are the results:




Data we obtained are *almost identical as in previous surveys*. Based on these data we can say that joining the EU has *almost consensual support of Montenegrin citizens* and this is one of the rare political issues, within public opinion, about which *there are no party or political disputes*. Nevertheless, lets see the position of different political groupings supporters regarding EU membership:

Party identification	POSITION%		
	YES	NO	No position
Pro-government supporters	92,1	2,2	5,7
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	72,1	8,2	19,7
Supporters of LSCG	87,7	7,7	4,6
Supporters of GZP	86,1	4,0	9,9
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	76,6	5,7	17,7
Abstainers	92,1	2,6	22,9

Supporters of all party groupings support membership in EU although there are certain differences in the level of that support. Supporters of pro-government parties support membership in EU for 20% more compared to supporters of pro-Serbian parties, while the others are somewhere in between these two regarding the level of support.

MEMBERSHIP IN NATO

Unlike joining the EU, position of public opinion toward military integration, or more precisely, membership in NATO is quite different. Here are the results of the research:




Most of the interviewees are opposed joining the NATO although that number is smaller than in April survey (36,3% in comparison to 41,3%). *However, the number of those who support joining the NATO is stabile* (somewhere around 35%). Proportionally, we have the increase in number of those who do not have an opinion on this issue. If you analyze position regarding military integration through prism of different political groupings supporters, you can see as follows:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>POSITION %</i>		
	YES	NO	No position
Pro-government supporters	59,5	16,5	24,0
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	15,1	64,4	20,5
Supporters of LSCG	47,7	38,5	13,8
Supporters of GZP	40,6	32,7	26,7
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	29,1	27,7	43,3
Abstainers	20,3	40,6	39,1

As you can see, there are significant differences between supporters of different political groupings regarding position on NATO. *Supporters of pro-Serbian parties stand out regarding this issue as they are dominantly against joining the NATO.* The biggest supporters of military integration are supporters of pro-government parties, while the supporters of Liberals and GZP, although majority of them in favor of joining NATO, are still pretty much reserved regarding this issue.

POSITION ON HAGUE TRIBUNAL

We have measured the position on Hague in its radical variant. We asked the interviewees are they *in favor of complete cooperation with Tribunal* including extradition of indicts. Here are the results:



Although the differences are small, there have been some changes in this survey regarding several previous ones, so *now the number of those supporting cooperation with Hague is bigger than those against the cooperation*. Here we present position on Hague of different political groupings supporters:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>POSITION%</i>		
	YES	NO	No position
Pro-government supporters	70,3	12,9	16,8
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	8,2	84,0	7,8
Supporters of LSCG	58,5	27,7	13,8
Supporters of GZP	55,4	27,7	16,8
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	40,4	31,9	27,7
Abstainers	29,7	45,8	24,5

As in earlier surveys, *the biggest number of cooperation supporters comes from pro-government supporters*, while the *biggest opponents are supporters of pro-Serbian parties*. Change in position of GZP supporters occurred because we had a change in structure of this group's supporters as we presented in earlier analysis. Finally, somewhat bigger number of cooperation supporters happened because of the change in position of supporters of other parties and those not identified as party members. In April survey, the number of opponents to cooperation with Hague was bigger from this grouping, while now within this category we have bigger number of those in favor of cooperation.

MAIN ALLIES IN FOREIGN POLITICS

Methodological experience from previous researches has served us as platform for changing the question with which we measure this aspect of political public opinion. While in previous researches we asked the interviewees to name only one foreign subject, in this research we asked the interviewees to evaluate especially to what extent State Union of SCG should rely on key international partners i.e. EU, USA, and Russia. In this way, we have significantly increased precision of obtained data. Results of this part of the research are indicating as follows:

Address in foreign politics	Position %				
	Not at all	A little bit	To a great extent	Completely	Can't assess
EU	6,2	14,9	31,9	36,5	10,5
USA	34,2	25,0	13,3	14,3	12,6
RUSSIA	32,5	24,1	16,3	11,5	15,6

Regardless of change in methodology, key finding is the same as in previous survey, i.e. the *biggest number of interviewees sees EU as key foreign-politics partner*. USA and Russia are seen as weaker political partners with small advantage of USA. If we look at the results from point of view of different political groupings supporters, we can see as follows:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>POSITION REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE SHOULD RELAY ON EU %</i>				
	Not at all	A little bit	To a great extent	Completely	Can't assess
Pro-government supporters	2,9	11,0	33,0	45,0	8,1
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	13,5	27,0	27,0	25,8	6,7
Supporters of LSCG	7,8	9,8	33,3	41,2	7,8
Supporters of GZP	1,4	8,1	40,5	41,9	8,1
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	3,8	12,5	33,7	33,7	16,3
Abstainers	6,7	13,5	28,8	32,7	18,3

From this table one can see relative differences in position on EU. While for pro-government supporters and Liberals, EU represents key partner in foreign politics, supporters of pro-Serbian parties have somewhat reserved position. Here is the analysis regarding position on USA:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>POSITION REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE SHOULD RELAY ON USA %</i>				
	Not at all	A little bit	To a great extent	Completely	Can't assess

	Not at all	A little bit	To a great extent	Completely	Can't assess
Pro-government supporters	15,8	21,5	22,5	26,3	13,9
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	65,6	21,5	3,7	3,7	5,5
Supporters of LSCG	37,3	33,3	13,7	5,9	9,8
Supporters of GZP	18,9	37,8	24,3	12,2	6,8
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	28,8	23,1	10,6	16,3	21,2
Abstainers	36,5	26,0	8,7	10,6	18,3

Pro-government supporters, besides EU see even USA as important partner in foreign politics, while supporters of pro-Serbian parties by far think that we shouldn't rely on USA at all. On the other hand, even Liberals (although in far smaller percentage) think that we shouldn't rely on USA, while GZP supporters are expressing dominant position that we should rely on USA moderately. Here are the results regarding Russia:

<i>Party identification</i>	<i>POSITION REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE SHOULD RELAY ON RUSSIA %</i>				
	Not at all	A little bit	To a great extent	Completely	Can't assess
Pro-government supporters	38,8	27,8	11,0	5,7	17,2
Supporters of pro-Serbian parties	19,0	19,0	25,8	27,6	8,6
Supporters of LSCG	37,3	19,6	17,6	9,8	15,7
Supporters of GZP	36,5	31,1	20,3	4,1	8,1
Supporters of other parties and not identified as party members	32,7	22,1	12,5	7,7	25,0
Abstainers	36,5	24,0	12,5	7,7	19,2

Besides *supporters of pro-Serbian parties who see Russia as key partner in foreign politics, supporters of all other groups by far consider that we should not rely on Russia or just maybe but moderately.*

ENGAGEMENT IN SOLVING LOCAL COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

Strengthening of local self-government and importance which local community has in democratic society is one of important indicators of the civil principles strength. Thus, one of the questions in our research was related to engagement of citizens in local community. Here are the results:

<i>Level of activity</i>	<i>%</i>
I am very much engaged	3,5
I am engaged partially	12,8
So far I wasn't engaged but I intend to	28,8
I don't want to get engaged in this	53,5
No response	1,4

Most of the citizens are not engaged nor do they have intention to become engaged in the work of local community. At the same time, we have little bit more than 16% of engaged citizens in different fields of activity. However, it should be noted that almost 30% of interviewees expresses readiness to engage in local community. Of course, we should bear in mind that engagement, which is here expressed in future tens, might be realized in various forms and scope. Thus, in order to realize this potential, it would be necessary to examine the forms and scope of potential engagement of citizens within their local communities.

EDUCATION REFORM

Reform of education is one of the ongoing processes of social reform. Regarding citizens' position on reform, we have been examining two aspects. First, and certainly important aspect was the level of information citizens received about the very reform.

<i>LEVEL OF INFORMATION OBTAINED</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
Not informed	24	33,5
Partially informed	35	34,2
Sufficiently informed	25	18,6
Completely informed	14	7,8
Not interested in	3	5,9

From this table it is obvious that *1/3 of citizens was not informed about education reform while a little bit more than 1/3 is partially informed*. On the other hand partially and *completely informed are 1/4 of citizens*, while certain small percentage is not interested in education reform at all. We should keep in mind that *reform process is related to primary schools* (in the first phase), so it is understandable that certain categories of society (the ones without children or with children above this age) really do not have any reason to be interested in the education reform. Regarding the expectations from the reform, we may see the following:

<i>EXPECTATIONS</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>
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It will improve education system	34	26,2
Won't bring anything new	14	14,0
It will make education system even worse	12	14,8
Do not know, can't assess	39	44,9

Little bit more than 25% interviewees thinks that reform shall improve education system, while on the other hand the number of those who think that reform won't bring any novelties and those who think that reform will deteriorate existing education system is equal. However, the biggest number of interviewees said that they could not assess what corresponds with data showing that big number of interviewees was not informed about this reform. $\frac{1}{4}$

POSITIONS ON JUDICIARY AND JUDGES:


Positions on judges and judiciary, in this research were examined through couple of key indicators, which are realized through ordinal scales. Interviewees gave specific answers regarding every work indicator of judges and judiciary. Here are the results:

Judiciary and judges in Montenegro are:	POSITIONS %				
	Very much	Mostly	Partially	Not at all	Can't assess
<i>Impartial</i>	6,9	10,9	24,8	26,8	30,6
<i>Professionally capable</i>	11,7	28,1	23,8	9,5	26,9
<i>Efficient in solving disputes</i>	4,3	11,1	26,3	32,3	26,0
<i>Incorruptible</i>	8,5	12,0	18,7	25,8	35,0


First of all, we should notice that big number of interviewees (in average 30%) is not capable to evaluate all aspects of judges and judiciary. These are probably citizens, who do not have contacts with that institution. Remaining interviewees, in general, expressed more negative than positive position. They were most critical of the judges and judiciary efficiency. Regarding this aspect, almost 1/3 of the interviewees think that judiciary and judges are not efficient at all. *Best-rated aspect of judges is their expert knowledge* (in comparative sense). Thus, when dealing with judges, the interviewees do not question their professional knowledge but they question situational and general social factors, which are resulting in poor rating of judges and courts' work.

CONFIDENCE IN TELEVISION

Measurement of confidence in media is one the standard aspects in our research. For the sake of methodological accuracy, we should point out that *we are not measuring rating but confidence*, which citizens demonstrate regarding all media in Montenegro. Here are the results regarding confidence in TV stations:




From this table we can see that a *little bit more than 1/5 of interviewees do not have confidence in any TV station*. Televisions enjoying the biggest confidence are TVCG (18%) and TV Pink (18,7%). If we look confidence in TV on the level of Podgorica, we may see the following:



In Podgorica TV Pink enjoys even greater confidence and it amounts to 1/5 of the interviewees. TV CG and TV IN enjoy slightly smaller confidence in Podgorica compared to level of entire population. The same applies for TV MBC, but in case of this television, confidence is very small on both levels. Other TV stations in Podgorica enjoy somewhat bigger confidence than on level of entire population.


CONFIDENCE IN RADIO:

Speaking about confidence in radio stations, we must notice the following:



If we have in mind that under term local radio stations we have quite big number of different radio stations, we may say that *Montenegrin Radio enjoys the greatest confidence on the level of entire population, followed by Radio Elmag*. All other stations are legging far behind these two

stations. If we look at confidence in radio stations in Podgorica we may see the following:



Thus, Montenegrin Radio still enjoys the greatest confidence, followed by Radio Elmag. Difference regarding entire population is the confidence, which citizens of Podgorica have in Radio D.

CONFIDENCE IN DAILY NEWSPAPERS

One of the key data, which differs in our April and June surveys, is confidence in newspapers. From these differences, we are presenting comparative review of the results from these two surveys:

Daily:	April %	June %
Pobjeda	10,8	8,6
Vijesti	25,7	29,1
DAN	14,0	22,1
Publika	1,8	1,9
Politika	1,3	0,9
Veèernje Novosti	5,7	4,3
Blic	0,1	0,5
Other dailies	2,1	1,4
No confidence	38,4	31,2

First of all, it should be noted that number of interviewees who don't have confidence in any newspapers has reduced (for about 7%). Confidence in "Pobjeda" has somewhat decreased, and confidence in "Vijesti" increased. However, the *key difference lies in confidence in "Dan" which has increased for 8%*. It is obvious that tragic death of editor in chief of this daily has brought about the change. This data tells us how actual social events powerfully influence fluctuation

within public opinion.

[1] Basic results of CEDEM's researches of political public opinion might be found on sit www.cedem.cg.yu