


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No 15 • October - December 2005

NEWSLETTER



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EU Enlargement

The EU enlargement has been a subject of debate within the EU for a long time, both with regard to the choice of the expansion scenario as well as the assessment of the positive and negative effects of the new membership. Securing stable democracies and economic growth were the main aims of the EU. It is the first time in history that nation-states free willingly decide to work closely together on a democratic basis and by giving up part of their sovereignty. The EU can be proud of its success:

1. For the social progress it has achieved, which is unique in the world;
2. For its economic progress. It is the biggest economy in the world, the biggest exporter in the world and one of the richest areas in the world, with the highest standard of living;
3. All members and the Union itself have a stable democracy;
4. Europe is known for its cultural richness and its diversity.

Civil society organizations, next to political parties, have important roles to play to inform the people about the unique and successful EU, which as heads of state said, still has to become even more democratic, transparent and efficient in an enlarged Europe. More than half a century of integration has had an enormous impact on the history of Europe and on the mentality of Europeans. The member state governments know that the age of absolute national sovereignty is over and that only by joining forces and pursuing "a destiny henceforward shared" can their ancient nations continue to make economic and

social progress and maintain their influence in the world. Integration has succeeded in overcoming age-old enmity between European countries. Attitudes of superiority and the use of force to resolve international differences have been replaced by the "Community method" of working together. This method, which balances national interests with the common interest and respects national diversity while creating a Union identity, is valuable today as ever.

EU Eastern Enlargement Process

EU eastern enlargement was a long-term process affected the whole of Europe. The assessments that the potential benefits significantly outweigh the costs prevail. In quantitative terms, after enlargement of ten new countries the area of the Union is enlarged by about one-third whereas its population is increased by 29%. Qualitatively, the accession of Central and Eastern new member countries dramatically alter the political map of Europe as it has been for the last five decades. The beginning of this change was the raising of the Iron Curtain in 1989. The following are listed some of the many benefits: a significant increase in the market to around 500 million inhabitants, greater security for investment in particular in the applicant countries with growth that is above the EU average, opening of approximately 300,000 new jobs, growth acceleration, faster technological development, greater stability of the EU, promotion of peace and stability in Europe, etc. The countries that became EU

members are also expected to reap significant benefits, on the political as well as on the economic and security plane. This refers in particular to the increase in social wealth and living standard of the population. Apart from the potential benefits, the new members will also assume certain responsibilities, including financial ones - namely costs.

Today the EU is a Union of 25 European Countries. The EU - and Europe as such will not be the same after this historic enlargement which will lead to a historical unification of the European continent, joining the countries of the Old Continent into one community, expanding from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. It is not only a "giant leap" for each new member country but for EU as well. Such a desirable development will close the door to a past characterized by war, oppression and division. It will open a door to a future with peace, stability unity and prosperity. The core vision of European Integration after World War II was to ensure such a degree of cooperation among the former European powers and countries that the "old mechanisms" should be stopped forever. That war should be inconceivable in Europe. No one could today conceive of a war between any of the present EU members. It is simply unthinkable. That is, when all comes to all, one of the most important achievements of European integration. The enlargement process will approach the Western Balkans also. And that is what the Stabilization and Association Process says. The further enlargement process will be based on the same principles and on the same criteria that so far have guided the process, i.e. the Copenhagen criteria¹⁾ - adopted at the European Summit in Copenhagen in June 1993. Another point, very interesting, is reference to the absorption capacity of Europe. That is a major challenge. The enlarged EU of 25 countries and 454 million people will expand even further in 2007, when Bulgaria and Romania join - if all goes according to the plans agreed at Copenhagen. It is not easy to take in large numbers of new members in a short period of time. EU is looking very carefully at all the implications of absorption of these new countries.

1) At the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen (1993), the presidents of the states or governments of the EU member countries agreed that the interested associated members would be admitted into the EU membership. It was agreed that the listed countries could become full members once they comply with the following conditions: (1) stability of institutions that provide democracy, state of law, respect of human rights and minorities, (2) the existence of an efficient market economy, (3) the ability of domestic enterprises to cope with the pressures of the common EU market, and (4) the ability to take on the obligations implied by the membership, including the implementation of aims of the political, economic and monetary union

Doubtless, the efforts are needed on both parts in the inevitably changing Europe: to adopt the proper policy for further enlargement (meaning, to include the South-eastern European countries) which appears not so far in the future, it could have been appropriate to struggle for shifting both the positions of the international community as well as of the local leadership. A possible strategic approach could lead from stabilization to enlargement, from international micro-management of the region to macro-management with greater local responsibilities and from an international institutional proliferation to an integral institutional framework. By integrating Southeastern Europe into mainstream Europe, the EU would not only stabilize its Southeastern flank but would also be able to protect its values and standards and project them to other parts of the world in a more convincing manner.

South Eastern Europe

I want to stress that the term: "South Eastern Europe" is very special, given the complexity and heterogeneity of the region. At the same time, this term bears also the evolution of the EU approach to the region. Precisely, in most EU's documents South East Europe was divided into two categories. First category embracing so-called: "certain South Eastern European countries" that includes the formula 5 + 1 - 1 (Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, plus Albania and minus Slovenia: from ex-Yugoslav package). Second category includes the rest of the geographic South Eastern Europe region (Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece).

This EU approach reflects the first feature of the EU policy towards certain regions and especially towards Balkans and the remaining part of the South Eastern Europe (SEE): the principle of differentiation. EU applies this differentiation according to the economic and political development of concerned countries, as well as their security and international position. EU has recently marked first category of

countries with the term: Western Balkans. Those are the countries that used to be included into EU Regional approach that has expanded into current Stabilization & Association Process for the Western Balkans. The second category of countries is also to be divided – in accordance with the EU criteria – into a) advanced countries, such as Slovenia and Hungary and b) promising countries: Romania and Bulgaria. SEE region is very heterogeneous in its structure given the international position of concerned countries as well as its economic dimensions. Political classification and economic differentiation are the reasons of "extracting" the region of "Western Balkans" from the rest of Southeastern Europe region by the EU approach. EU policy towards Western Balkans is based on primarily security approach, which means that the EU is trying to prevent conflicts and ethnic rivalries that are so highly developed in the region of Balkans. The whole array of EU instruments, aid schemes, trade incentives, contractual relations, political support, as well as other encouragement for Western Balkans countries are focused at creating another area in Europe, besides the area embraced by the EU Member States, where military conflict will become unthinkable and thereby to expand to SEE the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom which the Member States have created in the last 50 years. Exactly this point makes the EU policy towards SEE countries very specific when compared to the EU enlargement policy, which is based on more economic criteria, as well as geopolitical.

The European Council in Feira in June 2000 confirmed the objective of the fullest possible integration of the countries of the Western Balkans into the political and economic mainstream of Europe and recognized the countries as potential candidates for EU membership. The Copenhagen European Council in December 2002 reaffirmed this perspective. It underlined the European Union's determination to continue to support them in their efforts to realize their European aspirations. The Brussels European Council in March 2003 stated that "the future of the Western Balkans is within the EU" and invited "the Council and the Commission to examine ways and means, based also on the experience of the enlargement process, to further strengthen the Union's policy towards the region." The unification of Europe will not be com-

plete until these countries join the European Union.

The situation in the Balkans is considerably more favorable today than it was before; there have been significant progress in the regional cooperation in many respects (agreements, regional initiatives, cross-border relations, easier circulation of people, goods and capital, the low probability of renewed regional conflict, and the fact that all regional governments are preparing for EU accession, etc.) Important progress has been achieved in the stabilization of the region after a decade of conflicts and crises. There is a realistic perspective for the region to overcome the crisis, because it is for the first time that in all countries of South Eastern Europe there are democratically elected state leaderships which have proclaimed the same goal – joining the EU. Countries in the region are moving from reconstruction to economic recovery and sustainable development. All of them place high priority in their European prospect and, as potential candidates for membership, have embarked, albeit at different paces, in the Stabilization and Association Process. In the next couple of years, all of the most important decisions about the Balkans will be made. The European Union will also start negotiating with Croatia in 2005 or 2006. Bulgaria and Romania are set to join the EU on Jan. 1, 2007. A decision on the final status of Kosovo is expected next year, though the actual implementation will take several years, while Serbia and Montenegro will choose either to prolong or terminate their state union. Finally, next year decisions are needed on the EU candidacy of Macedonia and changing the character of the international military and political presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. If all these decisions flow as expected, practically all the outstanding problems will have been solved by early 2007, and the irreversible Europeanization of the whole of the Balkans will have been set in motion.

The European Union is physically approaching the Balkans and its interest for the region strengthens further on, but on the other hand, there is a danger of further economic divisions of the European continent, since one can likely expect that transitional countries with better performances will receive greater public assistance and more private investments, than less developed countries which are predominantly located in this region. However, the EU

enlargement process which is completed and operational from 2004 causes quite some concern among the countries of Western Balkans in respect to their position and status after the admission of current new members. The period of reconstruction and stabilization of Western Balkans is entering its closing phase, financial assistance of the EU is due to be reduced and the previous enlargement may likely cause the feeling of isolation, particularly if slowing of foreign trade, investments and imposition of visas occur. Yet at this moment, popular anxiety over any further enlargement, now very apparent in the internal politics of EU member states, risks weakening the most effective tool in the hands of the EU for dealing with this troubled region.

Just throwing money at the Balkans, for reconstruction or appeasement, does not lead to any fundamental changes either in belief or in behavior. It is only when the prospect of EU integration becomes an operational possibility that the EU starts playing a modernizing role in the region. This is the reason that countries like Bulgaria and Romania, perhaps surprisingly, have been able to stay out of the post-Cold War Balkan mess. The early promise of EU membership has anchored these countries in the process of democratization, reform and economic integration. Though they have lagged behind the more successful Central European countries, they will still manage to transform enough to join the EU in 2007 or thereabout. Unfortunately, when it comes to the other Balkan countries the EU has only recently begun to develop a clear strategy.

Western Balkans region, as a whole, needs support and concrete EU assistance on its European integration path through the Stabilization & Association Process. This is a developing region with high unemployment rates, significant macroeconomic imbalances and pervasive corruption and criminality. In the last few years, the growth rates throughout the region have been high. On average, the region has been growing by 5% or more. There are pockets of recession, mainly around the last areas of latent conflict, but those are shrinking. Clearly, investments are of crucial importance and will have to come from abroad. Also, the Balkans does not export very much, partly because of their internal disintegration and subsequent low market access. The same problems sap

the region's tourism industry. The Balkans is beautiful and interesting, and both the coasts and the mountains will be very attractive once politics are normalized and infrastructure is upgraded.

It is important to stress that the EU enlargement process and its policy towards the Balkan countries remains within more general framework of overall EU common foreign policy, which for itself suffers from many institutional deficiencies and of other political shortages when common interests of Member States are to be determined. Therefore it is necessary for all Balkan countries to be aware of these EU limitations in order not to put too ambitious expectations from the EU. It remains to be seen whether the future borders of the enlarged Union (25 - 32 Member-States) would ensure not to be the dividing line between plenty and poverty in Europe. In other words, which conception would prevail: option one: "Fortress Europe" or option two: Enlarged Union as an active international player with constructivist approach to its immediate neighbors.

I do not believe in the notion of the "end of history" – as far as the European Union is concerned, it is a history of regular periodic enlargements. Given the abidance by the Copenhagen criteria and according to the provisions of the EU Agreement, each European country can qualify for EU membership. This raises the issue of geographic boundaries between Europe and the European Union. The worst possible scenario is for the Western Balkans to be perceived as some kind of good neighborhood in the long term. Therefore, this question should be seriously addressed and solutions sought in the period before us in order to have unimpeded pace of stabilization, security, development and progress that will lead us to European integration. The obvious achievements in the region should not be left where they are or put at jeopardy. On the contrary, as the last enlargement is a turning point for the EU, it is also a turning point for the region.

It is also very important to emphasize possibility of the opposite option, i.e. enlargement, that the process of enlargement may be halted, the EU sealed off, and the region further marginalized. Those interested in continuing Balkanization will not give up so easily. Regarding situation in Serbia, in view of the growing awareness of the massacre of about 8,000 Muslims in

Srebrenica in 1995, that becomes not only politically but morally unbearable. Cooperation with the Tribunal, not just in Serbia but overall, is not very high and some of the most notorious fugitives are still regarded as heroes. Most probably enjoy state protection. Nationalism and ethnic tension remains an obstacle to reconciliation and integration. The 2001 interethnic conflict in Macedonia demonstrated how easily parts of the region could slip into crisis.

European integration of the South Eastern Europe and especially the Balkans region is based on mutual interest between the EU and the concerned countries. Precisely, it is certainly cheaper for the EU to support economic reforms and legal coordination with European standards and rules, than to finance new peace-keeping missions or police units on the spot. Furthermore, migration flows from the area of South Eastern Europe, and especially from the Balkans are not to be neglected. The so-called "strength" of the region, besides its transport and economic potentials, lies in its weakness. Old story about the region as the gunpowder is not outdated yet. There is a lot to be done, with mutual forces, with local ownership initiatives and with European guidelines and help, on the establishment of "European Balkans". Consolidation of democratic institutions and building market, together with the process of law harmonization with the *acquis communautaire*, is necessary for creation of modern European states in the Balkans. Of course, whole region is lagging behind Western European countries and Central European countries, as well, but there is enormous potential in favor of "Europeanization" of the region. Pro-European mood exists in prevailing percentage of population in the region and peaceful solution of problems is underway. Those are facts that illustrate great need for EU policy reform in the region of Balkans in terms of more flexible and more constructive EU approach, i.e. more carrots, less sticks. Main aim of the EU contribution to the stability of the region is to include it, as soon as possible, into EU enlargement process after the 2004. EU's financial assistance and investments are helping these countries to bring their economic and social structures into line with the EU's standards, but Union's support is not sufficient to prepare for EU membership. Future candidate countries of South-Eastern Europe have to

reinforce their administrative and judicial abilities to the point where they are ready to take on the obligations of the EU membership in order to get the most out of joining the EU.

The EU has very often officially declared that the success of its policy towards Western Balkans would be real efficiency - test for the EU common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and for the credibility of the whole EU. The success of the EU policy in this context means effective integration of concerned countries into European mainstream, strengthening of the EU influence in the region and parallel evolving of the EU's whole identity as an actor in international relations. Meanwhile, the EU continues to strengthen its influence in the region - predominantly in economic and political dimensions - while security guarantees and defense implications, for now, leaving to the NATO for accomplishing. Providing pre-accession assistance in the Western Balkans would only strengthen the EU's political leverage in the region. It would create a credible perspective on membership within a decade, giving new heart to all those struggling for stability and prosperity in the region. Banks in EU nations own most of the Balkans' banking and financial sector, and the Union should push them to spur foreign investment in the region. Also, the EU should foster regional cooperation in trade, investments and policy coordination.

Currently, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro are outside the security structures of NATO, even its Partnership for Peace program. There are reasons for that, namely that the most notorious war criminals are still at large, but there are also reasons to speed up the process of NATO accession. Security is still important problem of the region, and there is no other umbrella organization that could supply it. Additionally there is still insufficient control over some military and paramilitary forces, and only the prospect of NATO integration could induce local politicians to speed up the transformation of local armies and the dismantling of paramilitary forces. That would also contribute to a sharp decrease of criminal activities, as those are mainly run or supported by the military and other security services.

By 2007, with the next enlargement, the region will be surrounded entirely by EU members. It is only the prospect of following the countries of Central

Europe and the Eastern Balkans (Bulgaria and Romania) into the EU that gives the countries of the Western Balkans any hope of avoiding becoming a ghetto of underdevelopment in the midst of Europe. A credible strategy for integrating the region into the EU, and preventing the emergence of a Balkan ghetto, is critical not just for the region, but also for the EU itself.

- Thessaloniki Summit -

Following the signature of the Treaty of Athens in April 2003, which paved the way to the accession of ten new Member States, the Thessaloniki Summit provides the occasion to give a new impetus to the Stabilization and Association process. The success of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in satisfying the criteria for EU accession should give inspiration and encouragement to the countries of the Western Balkans which share this aspiration. At the Thessaloniki Summit (June 2003) the European Council accepted the proposals of the European Commission regarding the ways to support the countries of the Western Balkan in the process of their future integration with the European Union.

Summit in Thessaloniki between the EU and the countries of the SAP was marked a new mile-stone in the special relationship between the European Union and the Western Balkan. It aimed to send a strong political message to the countries and peoples of the region, namely that:

- The Balkans remain a priority for the European Union, high in its agenda
- The EU is committed to the European future of all Balkan countries
- The European prospect is the most credible and attractive alternative for the region

At the same time the meeting reconfirmed the commitment of the SAP countries to rapprochement and gradual integration into the Union and their determination to work for the fulfillment of all related criteria and conditions, including democratic and economic reforms and development of regional co-operation. The Summit EU-Western Balkans in Thessalonica has been equivalent to what Copenhagen 1993 meant for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (firm political decision on enlargement).

A "realist" scenario for Western Balkan accession

Two years after the European Union assured the states of the Western Balkans at its Thessaloniki Summit that they share 'a common European destination', how far has the region progressed along the road to Europe?

Bulgaria, due to become an EU member on 1 January 2007, is probably the best comparator available. In total, Bulgaria's path from Association Agreement to membership will have taken 14 years. If Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania were to conclude SAAs in 2006 and proceed to make an immediate application for EU membership, then, following the Bulgarian precedent, they would accede to the EU in 2020. This is the "realist scenario". It assumes that Serbia-Montenegro and Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania would progress as quickly as Bulgaria did. However, it is hardly an inspiring vision for the supporters of Europeanization in the region.

Proposed assistance under the draft IPA Regulation (2007-2013) (million Euro)								
Assistance level	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
IPA total	1,426	1,631	1,734	1,977	2,294	2,441	2,564	14,067
Croatia	120	120	120	120	120	120	120	840
Macedonia	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	378
Turkey	1,000	1,150	1,300	1,450	1,600	1,750	1,900	10,150
Non-candidates	252	307	260	353	520	517	490	2,699

Planned assistance for potential candidates, 2007-2013 (in million Euro)									
	popu-lation	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Serbia	8.0m	113	138	117	159	234	233	220	1,214
Kosovo	1.8m	25	31	26	35	52	52	49	270
Montenegro	0.6m	10	12	10	14	21	21	20	108
Albania	3.2m	45	55	47	63	94	93	88	485
Bosnia-Her.	4.1m	59	71	60	82	119	118	113	622
Total	17.8m	252	307	260	353	520	517	490	2,699
Per capita		14.16	17.25	14.61	19.83	29.21	29.04	27.53	

The "realist scenario" for EU accession

Bulgaria	Serbia&Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania	
1993	Association Agreement	2006
1995	AA enters into force	2008
1995	Membership application	2008
1997	Candidate status	2010
2000	Opening negotiations	2013
2004	Closing negotiations	2017
2007	Membership	2020

(_27) only in 2011. This suggests that EU planning for the Western Balkan potential candidates is indeed following the "realist scenario", with candidate status not expected before 2010, and membership well beyond the end of the coming budget cycle.

IPA and the Europeanisation of the Balkans – The Reform Scenario

IPA - The European Commission has prepared a draft Council Regulation Establishing an Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), on 29 September 2004), which will determine both the amount and, more importantly, the type of support the EU will make available to the Western Balkans between 2007 and 2013. For the time being, it is not out of the question that the total sum budgeted for the IPA assistance (some _14 billion) will be reduced in the tough round of EU budget negotiations to come. It is certain, however, that the money will not be increased beyond the level proposed by the European Commission.²⁾

If the EU is genuinely committed to the eventual integration of the Western Balkans into the Union, the IPA should be changed to create a much more dynamic strategy towards the region. The potential candidates in the Western Balkans should be given the chance to progress towards EU membership on an equal footing with previous candidates. If member-state building were to begin in 2007, it may be possible for countries of the region to achieve EU membership in 2014, in accordance with the ambitious agenda set out by the International Commission for the Balkans.

By subtracting these figures from the total available under the IPA Regulation, it is possible to calculate the funds which remain for the three potential candidates of the Western Balkans each year. Applying the assistance funds remaining for the potential candidates according to their population (note that EU population assumptions for these countries sometimes vary), gives the following breakdown:

The Reform Scenario

Bulgaria		Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Albania
1993	Association Agreement	2006
1995	AA enters into force	2007
1995	Membership application	2007
1997	Candidate status	2008
2000	Opening negotiations	2009
2004	Closing negotiations	2013
2007	Membership	2014-2015
14 years	Total	8-9 years

This budget illustrates in very concrete terms the Commission's assumptions concerning the region's progress through the accession process. Per capita assistance will reach the level available for candidates

2) The draft regulation states: "The intention is that future candidate countries should be treated broadly the same as past candidate countries. As the countries of the Western Balkans become candidate countries..., they will receive per capita per year about the level of assistance established in the financial perspective 2000-2006... for the 10 candidate countries."

EU membership is the only way to prevent the Western Balkans from turning into the black hole of Europe -without the Balkans in the EU, the process of unification will remain incomplete.³⁾

The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)

The stabilization and association process is something that was designed specifically for the Western Balkans. The European Union has looked at it as a sui generis region with a very special past, which has to be addressed in a very particular sort of way. There is a process which is designed to help the Western Balkan countries transform their aspiration, to become members of the European Union one day, into reality. And it establishes a strategic framework for the relations with the European Union as well as promoting the country's further integration into European structures. The stabilization and association process is a long-term commitment to the region that has given an impetus to a broad regional cooperation which had so far resulted in concluding of a myriad of agreements on trade liberalization, avoidance of double taxation, simplified movement of goods, capital and people (more liberalized visa regimes), cross border cooperation and similar, all of which in perspective lead to smoother association and/or integration of the region into the EU. These have been underpinned by Stabilization and Association Process (supported by the CARDS program and through the European Agency for Reconstruction) and the Stability Pact, which had become complementary, instruments supporting each other.

The issues addressed in the stabilization and association agreement are: 1. The principles of democracy and human rights, 2. Setting up mechanisms for political dialog, 3. Financial assistance, 4. Regional cooperation, 5. Free movement of goods, 6. Freedom of establishment, 7. Freedom to supply services, 8. Free movement of capital; Plus a very high degree of approximation of laws, very high expectations in

terms of law enforcement. The process is predicated on the same Copenhagen criteria that are applicable to the candidates, rule of law, democracy, functioning market economy and an administration able to adjust to the requirements of European integration.

Very important plank of the process is the financial assistance, which is known as the CARDS program. The EU is the largest donor to the Western Balkans. The CARDS program provides almost five billion EURO in assistance for the region for 2000-2006 period. The initial focus was on reconstruction. But there is now an increasing emphasis on institution building, strengthening administrative capacity, helping with the drafting of new legislation, to meet European standards. Most of the Community assistance is implemented in national programs, but there is a regional CARDS program as well, which dovetails with the activities that have been financed on the national level. The assistance is tailored to the specific needs of countries. There is a specific program for each of the countries. And the basic overriding objective of the assistance is to help the countries meet their obligations under a stabilization and association agreement, or future SAAs when they come.

Considerable further efforts are needed, however, to address the priorities attached to the Stabilization and Association process and to move towards satisfying the criteria for EU membership established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and laid down in Articles 49 and 6 of the EU Treaty. Effective implementation of the stabilization and association agreement is a prerequisite for any further assessment by the European Union of the country's prospects of accession. That is the case today and it is going to be a case in the future.

3) The Commission also urges the U.S. government to play a more active role in the region and says that coordinated EU-U.S. policies will be essential to ensuring peace and stability. Key recommendations: Resolving the status issues by Autumn of 2006; Holding an EU-Balkans summit in Autumn 2006 in order to move Balkan states to EU accession; Creation of an EU road map for each Balkan country by the end of 2006; Offering NATO membership as a key integration strategy, with Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia invited to join at the 2006 NATO summit

CEDEM activities

Seminar:

Freedom of expression, the right to respect for private life and the right to fair trial under the European Convention on Human Rights

Przno, November 10 -12

Seminar for Montenegrin judges, attorneys and advocates regarding "European Convention on Human Rights" (ECHR), were organized and held by the Council of Europe, AIRE (Advice on Individual Rights) Center from London, Judicial Training Center and the CEDEM. Different aspects of mentioned rights regarding ECHR and domestic laws and practice were discussed at the seminar.

This project has been supported by: British Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Westminster Foundation for Democracy, Council of Europe, European Agency for Reconstruction, Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Open Society Institute.



Seminar:

Antidiscriminatory legislation



Przno, December 21

One day discussion organized by CEDEM and Swedish Helsinki Committee. The discussion was about the need of creating Law against Discrimination. Representatives of national and international institutions that deal with this issue took part in the discussion.

CEDEM

Empirical Research Department

Political public opinion in Montenegro - December 2005

The research was conducted on a stratified, two-phase quota sample. The project was realised in 9 Montenegrin municipalities at the level of 1017 subjects. Field research and primary data processing has been made from November 26th until December 1st 2005. Project "Political public opinion in Montenegro" is supported by foundation Open Society Institute, office in Montenegro.

Position on Movements in Montenegro

%	may'05	sep'05	dec'05
Movement for Independent European Montenegro	35.7	39.2	37.8
Movement for European State Union S&M	34.0	38.9	36.9
Doesn't support activities of these movements	23.7	16.4	17.2
Can't decide	6.6	5.5	8.1

Referendum vote

%	jan'05	may'05	sep'05	dec'05
FOR independence of Montenegro	44.5	40.5	41.6	41.4
AGAINST independence of Montenegro	40.5	36.0	34.5	32.3
Doesn't know, doesn't have opinion on that	15.0	13.4	13.8	14.9
Wouldn't vote	-	10.1	10.1	11.4

Confidence in Institutions

	jan'05	may'05	sep'05	dec'05
Serbian Orthodox Church	3.28	3.45	3.27	3.19
S&M Army	2.56	2.74	2.69	2.59
Montenegrin President	2.56	2.63	2.61	2.63
Montenegrin Government	2.42	2.53	2.50	2.53
Montenegrin Police	2.45	2.52	2.51	2.52
Montenegrin Orthodox Church	2.24	2.33	2.28	2.26
Montenegrin Parliament	2.36	2.46	2.48	2.41
Montenegrin Judiciary	2.38	2.48	2.43	2.41
President of S&M	2.23	2.39	2.40	2.33
Parliament of S&M	2.01	2.25	2.18	2.22
Council of Ministries of S&M	1.97	2.22	2.17	2.21
Political parties in Montenegro	-	2.07	1.99	2.02

Election's preferences - individual parties

	Oct 2004	Jan 2005	May 2005	Sep 2005	Dec 2005
1. DPS	26.1	25.5	25.5	26.2	27.3
2. SNP	8.1	7.9	7.7	7.3	6.0
3. SNS	2.4	3.7	7.3	8.4	6.4
4. SDP	4.2	5.3	4.1	3.5	3.8
5. SRS /V. Šešelj/	3.8	3.7	2.8	4.4	3.1
6. NS	2.6	2.3	2.5	1.3	0.8
7. NSS	0.9	1.2	0.8	0.5	1.2
8. DUA	1.6	1.8	1.3	1.4	0.8
9. DSCG	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.5	1.1
10. GP	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.3	0.3
11. LPCG	-	0.8	1.5	2.1	2.2
12. GZP	10.1	7.8	11.3	9.1	13.2
13. DSS	0.9	1.0	1.6	0.3	0.2
14. Some other party	-	-	-	-	2.6
15. Indecisive	-	-	-	-	19.6
17. Abstinent	-	-	-	-	20.3

Idea of creating Union of Independent States Serbia and Montenegro

%	jan'05	may'05	sep'05	dec'05
Yes	36.6	31.4	31.2	34.3
No	42.1	42.2	39.3	38.3
Don't know, can't assess	21.3	26.4	29.5	27.3

Organizing the referendum in spring of 2006?

%	may'05	sep'05	dec'05
Yes	35.6	38.7	38.3
No	32.7	24.4	31.1
Doesn't know, doesn't have opinion on that	31.7	37.0	30.6

Should Montenegro, in your opinion, whether independent or in the state union with Serbia, be in the future:

1. Member of the European Union %

	Avg	Jan	May	Sep	Dec
	2004	2005	2005	2005	2005
1. Yes	82.4	78.9	80.1	77.0	81.2
2. No	5.5	6.1	5.6	6.4	4.8
3. No attitude	21.1	15.0	14.3	16.6	14.0

2. Member of the NATO Alliance %

	Avg	Jan	May	Sep	Dec
	2004	2005	2005	2005	2005
1. Yes	39.3	34.9	35.7	33.3	37.8
2. No	35.6	37.9	35.0	34.6	35.0
3. No attitude	24.1	27.2	29.3	32.1	27.2

2. Collaboration with Hague Tribunal %

	Jan	May	Sep	Dec
	2005	2005	2005	2005
1. Yes	44.8	44.9	47.4	49.7
2. No	38.3	39.3	33.1	31.0
3. No attitude	16.9	15.8	19.5	19.3

Who should be Montenegrin allies in foreign politics?

	Non	Little	Very	Completely	No
			much	opinion	
1. EU	7.7	19.3	37.6	27.9	7.5
2. SAD	34.7	26.4	18.8	9.4	10.4
3. RUSSIA	35.8	28.0	14.8	10.0	11.5

Note: 27.3 % of interviewees think that Montenegro should rely on nobody especially in area of foreign politics

Satisfaction with Montenegrin Government work

%	jan'05	maj'05	sep'05	dec'05
Very dissatisfied	35.0	36.2	33.4	3.26
Mostly dissatisfied	19.2	19.0	17.7	19.00
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	25.2	22.4	25.9	26.8
Mostly satisfied	14.2	15.7	17.9	15.4
Very satisfied	6.4	6.7	4.7	6.2

Confidence in politicians and public persons
Rank of politicians and Public Persons

	Avg	Jan	Maj	Sep	Dec
	2004	2005	2005	2005	2005
1. Milo Đukanović	2.66	2.63	2.67	4.40	2.79
2. Filip Vujanović	2.58	2.54	2.54	3.94	2.67
3. Svetozar Marović	2.49	2.35	2.43	3.29	2.39
4. Slobodan Milošević	2.20	2.28	2.33	1.32	2.20
5. Vojislav Koštunica	2.12	2.09	2.12	1.44	2.13
6. Ranko Krivokapić	2.29	2.27	2.21	3.74	2.31
7. Miodrag Živković	1.95	1.83	1.87	2.00	1.84
8. Predrag Bulatović	1.74	1.84	1.84	1.44	1.87
9. Predrag Popović	-	-	-	-	1.89
10. Ranko Kadić	-	-	-	-	1.77
11. Vojislav Šešelj	2.12	2.11	2.14	1.43	2.27
12. Zoran Žižić	1.98	2.09	2.01	1.37	1.94
13. Nebojša Medojević	3.03	2.86	2.95	2.73	3.07
14. Andrija Mandić	1.91	2.04	2.11	-	2.21
15. Amfilohije Radović	2.67	2.78	2.61	1.72	2.57
16. Boris Tadić	2.45	2.24	2.39	2.19	2.38

Comment: Completed Opinion poll results could be found on CEDEM's website: www.cedem.cg.yu

International conferences CEDEM's representatives took part:

Vladan Simonovic

November 13 - 18th , Kosovo



Vladan Simonovic, member of CEDEM's Board of the Directors, visited Kosovo as a member of Montenegrin delegation of Parliaments and NGO's. This visit is a part of East-West project Regional Cooperation between Parliaments and NGOs. Delegates from Macedonia and Montenegro had opportunity to meet political situation in Kosovo as well as the work of Parliament, international institutions and local governments. Delegation also visited Prishtina and Prizren. Project will be continued in 2006.

Srdjan Darmanovic

December 6 - 8, Brussels

Discussion regarding International Crisis Group Report on Montenegro, organized by OSIM (Open Society Institute - Montenegro), King Baudouin Foundation and European Policy Center.

Nenad Koprivica

Prague, December 5 -7

Center for Cooperation with Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina and Czech Council on Foreign Relations have organized workshop for NGO's from Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia. The main topics were the role of the civic society in Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia in the process of the European integration;

Belgrade, December 8-9

Meeting of the Steering Committee of Balkan Human Rights Network.

We were visited by...

Dr Bernhard Lamers - Head of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung - Office in Belgrade

Dr Viola Neue, Coordinator for Electoral and Parties research, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung